The firm-level societal and economic impact of private equity in Finland by Männistö, Lasse
The Firm-Level Societal and






Laskentatoimen ja rahoituksen laitos
HELSINGIN KAUPPAKORKEAKOULU
HELSINKI SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
HELSINKI SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS (HSE)                              SUMMARY
Finance, Master´s Thesis     27.2.2009
Lasse Männistö
THE FIRM LEVEL SOCIETAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PRIVATE EQUITY IN
FINLAND
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
This study addresses the lack of comprehensive research on the economic and societal
impact of private equity in Europe and especially in Finland. The thesis has two-fold
research objective; (1.) to build a solid understanding on how the societal and economic
impact can be assessed in Finland based on existing literature and (2.) to empirically
examine what can we say about the firm-level societal and economic impact of the
investing activities of the members of Finnish Venture Capital Association in Finland.
DATA
This study uses a unique hand collected dataset on the companies that have received their
first-ever  private  equity  investment  from  a  member  of  Finnish  Venture  Capital
Association in 2002-2004. The sample includes all Finnish companies (191) that have
received a first-ever private equity investment by a member of FVCA during this period.
Data is collected from the National Board of Patents and Registration of Finland databases
for the investment year and the three following years and it includes the following firm-
level measures: sales, number of employees, total assets and intangible assets, corporate
taxes  and  gross  margin.  Based  on  NBPR  data  growth  figures  can  be  calculated  for  146
companies of the sample (77%).
The control group is collected by matching the profile of the private equity financed
companies to Finnish companies that did not receive private equity financing. Main line of
operations, sales and registration date to the trade register are used for matching.
RESEARCH RESULTS
The growth of sales and personnel of the PE-funded companies in Finland is faster than
the growth of non-PE-funded companies based on comparative statistical analysis and
basic OLS regression models. The results of the OLS regression models also suggest an
association between PE-funding and faster intangible assets and total assets growth.
The faster growth of the PE-financed companies firm-level measures may be a result  of
the VCs being able to select portfolio companies that have comparatively larger growth
potential instead of the true added value VCs are often argued to supply. Also both of
these sources may apply, but we cannot fully reliably identify the actual value adding
impact separated from the VC target selection effects.
The comparative growth of sales, personnel, intangible assets and total assets are stronger
for PE-funded companies operating in high-tech industries, especially within knowledge
intensive services sector, and/or receiving PE-funding in seed investment stage.
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11 Introduction
1.1 Background for the Research
”Venture capitalists are in it just for the money. Most are not out to do good for the world.
They manage money on behalf of pension funds, insurance companies, educational
endowments, and wealthy individuals. Their concern is not for your employees and
customers, or to build a long-term business.” – Vivek Wadhwa, Wertheim Fellow at the
Harvard Law School. (BusinessWeek, 17.7.2006)
The European private equity investments hit an all-time high in 2007 rising up to €74 billion
(EVCA,  2007).  The  World  Economic  Forum  estimates  that  the  total  value  of  the  firms
acquired globally in the leveraged buyout transactions in 1970-2007 is $3.6 trillion, out of
which $2.7 trillion represent LBOs undertaken after 2000 (World Economic Forum, 2008). It
is easy to see that the growth of the private equity industry and it´s economic and societal
relevance has been fast in the recent years. The vast growth of private equity industry has
increased public interest regarding the effects of these investments on economy and on larger
society as whole.
Many concerned voices have also risen in the international press about the negative impacts
of private equity investments, blaming venture capitalists for example of only seeking fast
cash and not caring about the long-time development of the business. This public discussion
has awakened national and international private equity associations as well as academics to
take part in the game. As a result research around the economic and societal impact of private
equity has begun to emerge (Achleitner & Klöckner, 2005; Alemany & Martí, 2005; Engel,
2002; Engel & Keilbach, 2007; EVCA, 2007; Global Insight, 2007; Kjærgaard, 2004; Kortum
& Lerner, 2000; Peneder, 2007; Romain & van Pottelsberghe, 2004; World Economic Forum,
2008). The studies range from industry wide impact studies to firm-level studies. However,
the results of the former group of studies are often limited by their focus on aggregate
industry level and by the limited availability of measures.
The main focus of the studies in the field of economic and societal impact of private equity
has been the development of employment or innovation in the companies that have received
2private equity funding. Whereas the national and international venture capital associations
have usually presented the growth figures within the VC-industry, the academics have had a
broader focus. In their studies the development in the private equity financed companies is
usually compared to the development in the control group that has not received equity
financing.
The impact research has faced many challenges and at least partially due to these the research
activity has still remained relatively low. The problems that research has faced are often
related to the very few possibilities of acquiring good quality unbiased data, especially with
multiple measures of economic impact, or to the problems faced in defining the control group
in order to reliably measure the impact of private equity. Also on the methodological side the
problem with the non-randomness of the VC selection process has caused many concerns
among the academics.
This study addresses the lack of prior multiple measure research on the societal and economic
impact of private equity. This thesis is also one of the first pieces of literature concerning the
comprehensive firm-level impact of private equity in Finnish society and economy. The aim
of this study is to develop understanding on the firm-level measures of economic and societal
impact of private equity and how to assess this impact reliably in Finnish context. This study
further seeks to evaluate the impact of the private equity investments of the member
organizations of the Finnish Venture Capital Association (FVCA) with the developed
methods. The thesis seeks to provide an objective analysis of the firm-level impact of private
equity on Finnish society and economy using multiple different measures.
The used data is combined from two different sources. I will use the archival data on the first-
ever private equity investments of the members of FVCA in 2002-2004. Based on this
archival data the actual panel data is collected for 191 portfolio companies for year they
received the private equity investment and the three consecutive years. This data consist of
the portfolio companies’ historical financial information. The control group for the study is
collected using matching based on the data on the portfolio companies. Sufficient data is
obtained for 146 companies that are included in the analysis.
31.2 Research Gap
Private equity as a research topic has not been widely studied compared to different publicly
traded financial markets, such as stock markets. Two general reasons can be identified for low
research activity in this field. The first reason has been, and still is, the non-public nature of
private equity markets. Information and data about the transactions is not publicly available
and researchers have had to collect the data with questionnaires often resulting in low
response rates. Another reason for low research activity has been the fact that institutional
private equity investors and private equity markets are still relatively young phenomena,
especially in Europe, so not much information has been available altogether.
However, as the private equity market has developed and the private equity investors have
been releasing more data about their activities, the research topic has been receiving growing
attention in the recent years. Often national and multinational venture capital associations
have been in a major role as data providers and facilitators of research project in this field.
Europe is still far behind the US in both the academic and the non-academic research
conducted in the field of private equity.
The studies related to effects of private equity can be divided clearly into two broad lines of
research as pointed out by Alemany and Martí (2005). The first and by far the most
researched, line tries to explain the expected superior performance of VC-backed companies
with different rationales. The second, less researched, line is concerned with the overall
economic and societal impact of VC-funded companies and identifying this impact. Within
the second line of research most of the studies are conducted by national and international
venture capital associations and they have focused purely on specific research subjects such as
innovation  and  job  creation.  Studies  which  take  more  than  just  one  or  few  measures  of
economic performance into account are almost non-existent. An exception for this general
rule is the research conducted by Alemany and Martí (2005), which takes into account
multiple firm-level financial measures.
One of the most recent impact studies employing relatively evolved methodologies is the
research conducted by Bottazzi et al. (2007). The authors obtain four measures of VC
activism, namely involvement in recruiting the management, helping in assembling the board
of directors, assistance in obtaining additional financing and interaction with the portfolio
4company, and succeed at identifying significant value added through corporate governance
and participation. Engel (Engel, 2002 and Engel & Keilbach, 2007) has researched the firm-
level impact of venture capital extensively with methodologies seeking to overcome the often
faced challenges of impact research. His studies on venture capital and firm growth as well as
on the broader implications of VC funding on early stage firms have expanded the general
knowledge on the impact of VC financing substantially. The most recent publication that has
received attention especially within the global private equity fraternity has been the report
published by the World Economic Forum (2008) on the global economic impact of private
equity. This report is compiled from several studies conducted by the most recognized authors
seeking to approach the impact of PE-funding from various perspectives with a variety of
methodologies. Not many of these studies published by WEF, however, lay significant
interest on overcoming the methodological challenges of the impact research.
In Finland the Finnish Venture Capital Association (FVCA) has published in 2007 a short
report on the impact of venture capital. This report is based on evaluating only the
development of turnover and number of personnel in the VC-backed companies in Finland
and the analysis is based solely on the VC-backed companies’ development and not on
comparison to non-VC-backed companies. Some more analytical depth is obtained in the
master’s thesis conducted by Lähdemäki (2007) about the economic and societal impact of
the investments of CapMan Plc1. This research is, however, limited to investments made by
only one VC investor and the data consists of only 75 investments.
Profound research on the effects of private equity in Finland, as presented above, is almost
nonexistent. The few studies and reports that have been conducted in the field of economic
impact of private equity in Finland are limited to only one or few VC investors and only few
indicators of economic impact. None of the studies conducted in Finland have been based on
a carefully selected control group or obtain more methodological depth than basic statistical
analysis.
This master’s thesis addresses the lack of prior research on the comprehensive economic and
societal impact of private equity market in Finland. It drills down to the societal and economic
impact of Finnish private equity industry using multiple variables such as net sales,
1 CapMan Plc. is a private equity investor listed in the Helsinki Stock Exchange since 2001. CapMan invests in
companies that principally operate in the Nordic countries (Lähdemäki, 2007).
5employment, total assets, gross margin, intangible assets and corporate taxes. The analysis is
based on a unique data on the Finnish first ever VC investments in 2002-2004 and a carefully
selected control group of companies to whose the development of VC-backed companies is
compared. The selected methodologies also seek to overcome the general problem with the
VC selection effects.
1.3 Research Question and Objectives
The first objective of this thesis is to build a solid basis for understanding the firm-level
impact of private equity investments toward the economy and larger society. The second
objective is to empirically examine the impact of Finnish private equity investments by
analyzing the investments made to Finnish based companies by the member institutions of the
Finnish Venture Capital Association (FVCA). The research question derived from these
objectives can be stated as follows:
How can the firm-level societal and economic impact of private equity be assessed in Finland
and what can we say about the firm-level societal and economic impact of the investing
activities of the members of Finnish Venture Capital Association?
The first part of the question is more theoretical and we will focus on it in the literature
review part  of  this  thesis.  Different  methodologies  and  ways  for  analysis  are  presented  and
evaluated in order to build a comprehensive understanding of measuring the societal and
economic impact of private equity. The answer to the first part of the question should be a
reasoned research approach and design based on the current literature. Furthermore the chosen
methodologies should be implementable in the Finnish context and data will have to be
available with reasonable cost and effort. The selected measures will have to be chosen in a
way that they are valid and that they measure what they’re supposed to measure. In this study
one key point of interest will be the selection of the control group.
The second part of the research question is answered in the empirical part of this thesis and
this part is awaited to add value to the Finnish private equity impact research. The question
will be answered using the methodologies and measures presented and chosen when
answering to the first research question. Concerning this part of the research it is highly
6important to try to tackle the possible biases and the general endogeneity problem faced in the
impact research.
The investments conducted by the members of FVCA will be analyzed all together and in
separate groups based on the investment stage and whether the company operates in high-tech
or low-tech industry. The classification to different investment stages will be done in two
separate ways based on (1.) the methodology by EVCA (2008) and (2.) simple categorization
to venture capital and buyout investments as suggested by FVCA. The development of the
portfolio  companies  is  most  likely  to  differ  between  different  development  stages  of  the
portfolio companies. The base-point for the analysis will be the initial state of the VC-backed
company before the investor has affected it.
When conducting the actual analysis the selection of the control group will be one of the main
challenges. Control group is needed for comparing the development in the portfolio
companies to other companies and to verify the fact that the outcome would have been
different without financing from an outside venture capitalist.
1.4 Scope and Limitations
This thesis and its results are limited by geography, time and investor type. The research is
limited to companies that are originated in Finland and have received their first-ever private
equity investment during the period between January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2004.
Moreover only companies that have received investments from the full members of the
Finnish Venture Capital Association (FVCA), meaning the pure venture capital organizations,
are included in the study. The list of the full members of FVCA can be found in the Appendix
1.
The study is limited by the methodological challenges in assessing the societal and economic
impact of private equity. The general problem faced in the impact research is the endogeneity
problem caused by the selection effects that can affect the future development of the impact
measures. The question that remains is whether the VCs are able to select the companies that
would have developed in the similar manner also without VC financing. The challenge is that
when the impact of an investment (treatment) is assessed we would have to find an identical
7company that did not receive the treatment for a full reliability of the results. This is of course
not possible since no identical counterparties exist for the companies that have received
private equity financing. However, most sophisticated methods that Finnish databases allow
for matching are used in order to determine a valid control group for the private equity
financed companies in order to at least partially diminish the endogeneity problem. The
problem is taken into account also in the methodological selections.
Finally, the study is limited by the quality of the datasets that are used. The dataset has been
compiled  from  first-ever  investment  data  of  FVCA  and  data  from  the  annual  reports  in
Suomen Asiakastieto databases. Despite good overall coverage of the sample some challenges
are faced because of points of discontinuity in some companies’ data for example because the
company has not sent its annual financial information to the NBPR database or due to a
change in the corporate structure of the company. However, the number of these challenges is
relatively small and altogether data on 146 companies (77% of the sample) can be included in
the analysis.
1.5 Research Design and Methods
This research is conducted as a firm-level analysis on the impact of private equity
investments.  The approach is to analyze the firm-level impact of private equity not just based
on a single or few measures, as common in the current literature2, but to use various measures
of  firm-level  impact  in  order  to  obtain  a  comprehensive  view  on  the  topic.   The  research
includes individual firm-level measures for company size, employment, innovation,
profitability, total assets and government direct income as these measures clearly carry a
broad impact on the Finnish economy and society surrounding the company.
The data is collected for companies that have received their first-ever PE investment from a
Finnish based VC between 2002 and 2004. The data is collected for the investment year and
three following financial years. After collecting the data for the actual sample group each PE-
funded company is matched to a non-PE-funded counterparty by the main line of operations,
by investment year sales and by the age of the company. After this the data on the same firm-
level measures is collected for the control group as well.
2 See e.g. Achleitner and Klöckner (2005), Kjærgaard (2004), Engel and Keilbach (2007) and Peneder (2007).
8The methodology part of this thesis is divided into three separate parts: (1.) descriptive
analysis on the data, (2.) statistical analysis on the differences between companies that have
received their first-ever PE investment and their matched counterparties and (3.) regression
analysis seeking to identify the actual association between PE-funding and development of
these measures.
The primary analyses are conducted across different data categories using the absolute growth
of  sales,  personnel,  intangible  assets  and  total  assets  as  well  as  cumulative  taxes  during  the
observation period. Also a gross margin measure at the end of the observation period is
included to reflect the profitability of the companies. Absolute growth figures are used due to
many zero values in the beginning of the observation period especially for companies in early
investment stages. However, some additional analyses use relative growth figures in order to
gain further insight into the subject.
The regression analysis part is further divided into two separate methodological parts. The
first one employs basic ordinary least squares regression models in order to identify if the PE-
funding is associated with the development of the chosen measures without any correction for
the VC target selection effects. This analysis seeks to identify whether the PE-funded
companies measures grow faster than for the control group but it does not reveal the actual
added value of VCs as the possible faster growth may be also due to the selection effects. The
second part of the regression analysis seeks to reveal more about the actual value added by the
PE investors by employing a two-step procedure introduced by Heckman (1979) for
excluding the selection effects from the analysis.
1.6 The Most Relevant Findings
All in all the most relevant and reliable conclusion of this study is that the growth of sales and
personnel of the PE-funded companies in Finland is significantly faster than the growth of
non-PE-funded companies. This result is based on statistical comparison and basic OLS
regression analysis between PE-funded companies and their non-PE-funded counterparties
matched by industry sector, sales and company age. The results are statistically significant.
9The results of the basic OLS regression models also suggest a statistically significant
association between PE-funding and faster intangible assets and total assets growth. These
differences, however, do not quite reach 95% confidence level in the statistical analysis. Thus,
we must conclude that the growth of intangible and total  assets seems to be associated with
PE-funding but this dataset does not give fully unambiguous verification for this.
However, the faster growth of the PE-financed companies firm-level measures presented in
the previous paragraphs may be result of the VCs being able to select portfolio companies that
have comparatively larger growth potential instead of the true added value VCs are often
argued to supply. Also both of these may apply. We cannot fully reliably conclude whether
the exact source of the faster growth truly is the operations of PE investors within the
company after selecting their investment targets. The final regression analysis employing
Heckman (1979) two-step procedure, however, seeks to exclude the selection effects from the
value adding impact. The results of this analysis are consistent with possibility of true value
adding impact of VCs resulting in faster growth of sales compared to other companies. For
growth of personnel, intangible assets or total assets no statistically significant value adding
impact is identified but this does not rule out the possibility of such value adding impact to
exist. The applied regression model seeking to exclude the selection effects supposes that the
VCs selection can be modeled solely based on the financial information on the companies,
which is perhaps not fully realistic assumption, as the VC selection process may be driven by
unobservable variables such as business plan and management team quality.
The result of comparatively greater growth of PE-funded companies’ sales, personnel,
intangible assets and total assets is even stronger for firms operating in high-tech industries,
especially within knowledge intensive services sector, and/or receiving PE-funding in seed
investment stage. These qualifications of a PE-funded company seem to be associated with
even faster relative growth compared to the matched non-PE-funded companies. The results
are  based  on  the  statistical  analysis  on  the  comparative  growth  across  different  data
categories.
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1.7 Key Terms and Definitions
Buyout
Buyout refers to a transaction in which a business, business unit or company is acquired from
the current shareholders. Thus buyout investments are also a subset of private equity
investments and when the term `private equity` is used it is assumed to include buyout
investments. Different types of buyouts include management buyout (MBO), management
buyin (MBI) and institutional buyout (IBO). Buyouts are the most common type of later stage
private equity investments.
First-ever Private Equity Investment
First-ever private equity investment refers to a first private equity investment that any venture
capitalist makes to a specific portfolio company. Private equity financed companies receive
equity financing usually in multiple financing rounds over the life cycle of the company. Thus
first-ever private equity investment refers to the first private equity investment of the first
financing round.
Investment Stage
Investment stage is used to simultaneously refer to the development stage of the company
when it receives the first-ever private equity investment and to the transaction type of the
investment. The classification of the investment stages is applied in two ways.
The main classification followed in this paper is the definition of suggested investment stages
by EVCA. This definition of each investment stage is presented in the Appendix 2 (FVCA,
2008).
The second classification of investment stages is simple categorization of the investments to
either venture capital or buyout class as often done among the industry in Finland.
Portfolio Company
Company in which a venture capitalist has invested in is called a portfolio company before
the venture capitalist exits the investment. The investment may be a mezzanine loan granted
to the company or a direct equity investment.
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Private Equity
Private Equity (PE) refers to private equity capital and private equity investments in general.
Finnish Venture Capital Association (FVCA) defines a private equity investment as follows:
“Private equity investment means investing in companies not quoted on stock markets, but
which have good potential for development. Private equity can be used to start a new
company, to expand operations, to make acquisitions, to restructure a company or to
significantly alter a business. It can also resolve ownership and management issues, and for
example succession in family owned companies or a buy-out or buy-in of a business by
experienced managers may be achieved with private equity funding.” (FVCA, 2008)
According to the European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA) a private
equity investment refers to financing of unquoted companies with growth potential. Private
equity in general comprises all stages of financing: seed, start-up, expansion, replacement
capital and buyouts. (EVCA, 2007)
In this study the term `private equity` (PE) refers to the private equity field in general and
investments are specified as private equity investments.
Venture Capital
Venture Capital (VC) refers to equity financing that is provided for company which is in a
seed, start-up, other early or expansion stage. Thus VC is a subset of private equity and when
the term `private equity` is used it is assumed to include venture capital investments.
Venture Capitalist
Venture Capitalist is used to refer to an organization or person making not just a venture
capital investment but any investment in the private equity field.
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1.8 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two is a literature review that begins by
introduction to private equity and continues by reviewing two partially overlapping fields, the
value added literature and the impact literature. The third chapter presents the hypotheses of
the study and the reasoning behind them. The fourth chapter states the research approach and
describes the data as well as the control group selection. It continues by discussing the
methodology and the different firm-level measures included in the analysis. The actual results
of the analysis are presented in the fifth chapter. This chapter begins by presenting descriptive
analysis  of  the  data,  which  is  followed  by  statistical  analysis  with  respect  to  control  group
development as well as regression analysis. The final chapter draws conclusions and suggests
some avenues for future research.
13
2 Literature Review
The aim of this literature review is to review the research on the effects of venture capitalists
activities and to build a solid theoretical foundation for analyzing the societal and economic
impact of private equity in Finland.
This literature review is mainly focused on venture capital, since this has been the focus of the
vast majority of academics. Other forms of private equity are by no means discriminated as
also some studies on buyout stage of private equity are cited. The research on venture capital
in highly relevant for studying private equity in general and the methods applied in VC
studies are also applicable for analyzing the impact of private equity in a broader context.
According to Alemany and Martí (2005) the research on the effect venture capital can be
divided into two lines of research. The first line of research focuses on the added value
venture capitalists activities generate and tries to explain the superior performance of VC
backed companies. The research in this field is concerned for example about the role of target
selection, the changes in the monitoring and board structures of the portfolio companies and
the networks of the venture capitalists. The second and less studied line relates to the larger
economic impact of venture capital trying to measure the impact of VC financing. In this line
the literature is split up between studies focusing on only one of few specific subjects such as
innovation or job creation and studies focusing on impact of VC-backed firms in broader
scope. The goal of this thesis is to primarily follow the second line or research. However, also
the added value insight of venture capital is covered in the literature review because it
precedes the impact literature.
The categorization of literature introduced by Alemany and Martí (2005) does not directly
match all the different functions by which venture capital might exert an influence. Also some
of the most recent studies about the effect of venture capital partially overlap between the
categories introduced by Alemany and Martí (2005). However, as most of the overall research
on  the  effect  of  venture  capital  clearly  falls  under  one  of  the  categories  we  will  adopt  this
classification of literature in this literature review.
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After an introduction to private equity in general and to the different functions of venture
capital this literature review proceeds to reviewing the literature about the added-value by
venture capitalists. This section is followed by a section discussing the impact research and
reviewing this line of research in more detail. Also the different problems faced in the
research on the impact and value added of PE-funding as well as different methodologies used
are reviewed in this section.
2.1 What is Private Equity?
EVCA (2007) defines in the short that private equity is equity financing provided to unquoted
companies with growth potential. To deepen the understanding of the different aspects and
characteristics of private equity the Finnish Venture Capital Association (FVCA) illustrates
private equity with “The Private Equity Ecosystem” that is presented in the Figure 1. (FVCA,
2008)
In  this  ecosystem  the  first  step  involves  the  fundraising  phase,  where  a  private  equity  fund
gathers capital from various sources, with institutional investors such as retirement funds and
insurance companies typically representing the majority of funds raised. After the fundraising
is complete, the private equity fund begins seeking suitable businesses to invest in. In addition
to providing the company with capital, the investors also offer valuable expertise and take an
active interest in developing the business. This is typically achieved through working as a
member of the board. The entrepreneur thus effectively exchanges part of his or her
ownership in the company for the capital and the advisory services provided by the fund.
(FVCA, 2008)
The private equity fund then proceeds to develop and expand the business, thus increasing the
value of its investment. This added value is later realized in the exit phase, after which the
investors of the fund are compensated according to the returns realized in the exits from the
companies in the portfolio of the fund. In addition to providing returns to the investors of the
fund, private equity investors argue that they also benefit the economy as a whole. (FVCA,
2008)
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Figure 1: The Private Equity Ecosystem (FVCA, 2008)
Private equity investments can be divided into two different types of investments. These types
are venture capital and buyout investments (EVCA, 2002).
Venture capital (VC) is a source of financing whereby a financial investor takes an equity
stake in a private company that, in general, is starting up or will grow fast in the following
years (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). From entrepreneur’s perspective, VC funds are often the
only available source of additional financing to start up a company, especially if intangible
assets are at the core of the business.
Buyout refers to a transaction in which a business, business unit or company is acquired from
the current shareholders. Buyout investments are the most common type of later stage private
equity investments. Leveraged buyout (LBO) refers to a buyout in which the capital structure
of the company incorporates a particularly high level of debt, much of which is normally
secured against the company’s assets. Jensen (1986) identifies firms or divisions of larger
firms that have stable business histories and substantial free cash flow as the most desirable
buyout candidates.
Different  types  of  buyouts,  such  as  management  buyout  (MBO),  management  buyin  (MBI)
and institutional buyout (IBO), can be identified. In an MBO external managers take over the
company. Financing is provided to enable a manager or group of managers from outside the
target company to buy into the company with the support of private equity investors. An MBI
is otherwise a similar transaction with the exception of the management coming from outside
the target company. Institutional buyout refers to outside financial investors buying the
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business from the vendor. The existing management may be involved from the start and
purchase a small stake. (EVCA internet, 2008)
In the recent years the private equity market in Europe has experienced tremendous growth.
The annual volume of total private equity investments in Europe has increased from €10
billion in 1997 to €74 billion in 2007 making private equity market as one of the most
important financial market in the Europe. (EVCA, 2007)

























2.1.1 Private equity in Finland
Due to the strong government control and late opening of the financial markets in the 1990s
the private equity market in Finland has developed late compared to the US and the mainland
Europe. The annual volumes of the private equity investments were marginal in the beginning
of 1990s and the formation of the Finnish private equity industry can be seen to have emerged
in the years 1995-2000. During this period the annual volume of the private equity
investments rose from €38 million to €397 million in Finland. During this period the share of
public investments has decreased from 47.3% in 1995 to 11.6% in 2000 when comparing
public and private share of total investments. (FVCA, 2006)
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Despite the late emergence of the Finnish private equity industry the Finnish Venture Capital
Association (FVCA) has been founded already in 1990 to represent and develop the industry.
The association began collecting its own annual statistics of the Finnish private equity
industry already in 1990 but more systematical collection began in 2002 and from this
onwards some parts of the data has been made publicly available. (FVCA, 2006)
Today Finnish private equity industry consists of various types of investors but the market is
dominated by investors in the private sector. 37 Finnish institutions have received a full
membership in the FVCA and 74 are listed as associated members. Only institutions operating
in the Finnish private equity market as their primary form of operation can be given the full
membership on in FVCA. The full members of FVCA are presented in the Appendix 1.
(FVCA, 2008)
Private equity companies operate in the Finnish private equity market usually through
individual private equity funds. Companies collect capital to PE funds from various
institutional investors and further invest this capital into the portfolio companies. The
structure of a limited partnership fund is presented in the Figure 4. (FVCA, 2008)
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Figure 4: Limited Partnership Fund Structure (FVCA, 2008)
Finnish private equity investments peaked in the year 2007 as the total volume of new
investments was more than doubled from the previous year (FVCA, 2008). Due to the vast
growth of the private equity market in Finland the social and economic impact of private
equity remains a highly topical theme despite the fact that the investment activity is likely to
decrease significantly in 2008 and 2009 as the overall economy is sloping downwards.
2.1.2 Functions of Venture Capital
The research on the economic impact of venture capital is yet small but swiftly growing as the
awareness of this area finance rises and more data becomes available. However, the current
research already differs substantially and the scope of the analysis ranges from
macroeconomic panel estimations (e.g. Romain and van Pottelsberghe, 2004) to estimations
strongly based on sectoral data (e.g. Kortum and Lerner, 2000) as well as to
microeconometric research (e.g. Hellmann and Puri, 2000, 2002; Engel, 2002; Engel and
Keilbach, 2007). One often common denominator for the impact studies is the fact that they
rarely include companies not yet listed on the stock market because of the lack of available
data (Peneder, 2007).
Because of the varying contexts of different national markets as well as heterogeneous data
sources, methods and control variables, one has to be cautious about drawing general
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conclusions about the functions of venture capital. Peneder (2007) has, however, identified
three different functions, based on the current literature, by which venture capital may exert
and influence on overall economic performance. These different transmission mechanisms
seem to gasp most of the current impact literature’s views on the functions of venture capital.
The financing function of venture capital refers to the specific function of providing adequate
financial resources for business cases that would have had no access to financing through
traditional sources of capital. Through this financing function venture capital generates new
business cases that would not had emerged without VC financing. (Peneder, 2007)
The second specific function is named the selection function of venture capital by Peneder
(2007). This function involves the allocation of financial resources to the most profitable uses
when uncertainty and problems of asymmetric information are particularly high. The selection
function relates to the notion that the screening and selection process of venture capitalists
leads to selecting the most potential targets for venture capital financing. The research
conducted by Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) focuses on the selection function in the light of
inside information that is available to the venture capitalists when they make the investment
decisions.
Finally Peneder (2007) presents the broader value adding function that the venture capital
firms often claim to fulfill. The value adding function of venture capital refers to all the
activities after selecting the target companies and providing the financial resources.
The value adding function is the broadest of the three presented by Peneder (2007) and many
other academics have suggested other more specific functions for venture capital that fall
under this more general value adding function. Examples for the sources of added value, that
can be seen often also as individual functions, can be for example managerial and recruiting
experience, access to informal networks and even future possibilities based on the reputation
of the venture capitalist.3
Gompers (1995) focuses on particular monitoring function of venture capital that can be seen
to fall under the broader value adding function. His regression study shows that venture
capitalists  are  monitoring  their  portfolios  closely  due  to  concern  that  entrepreneurs  with
3 See, for instance, Kaplan and Strömberg (2004), Hellman and Puri (2002), Hochberg et al. (2007) and Hsu
(2004).
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private information and large private benefits will not want to liquidate a project even if they
have information that the project has a negative net present value for shareholders.
Entrepreneurs may also pursue strategies that enrich their reputation at shareholders’ expense.
Gompers (1995) concludes that venture capitalists monitor entrepreneurs with increasing
frequency as expected agency costs rise.
A research conducted by Lerner (1995) also focuses on the monitoring function of venture
capital  by  studying  the  board  composition  of  the  VC  backed  companies.  The  study  reveals
that the monitoring activities increase when the need for oversight is greater. This is identifies
for example as the venture capitalists’ representation on the board increases around the time
of  chief  executive  officer  turnover,  while  the  number  of  other  outsiders  remains  constant.
Papers conducted by Gompers (1995) and Lerner (1995) use samples that contain only VC-
backed  companies  and  thus  rely  on  changes  over  time  and  differences  within  VC-backed
companies. Opposed to these papers and methodologies are studies that concentrate on the
differences between the VC-backed and non-VC-backed companies.
Hellman and Puri (2002) have studied a support function of venture capital on team building
or CEO turnover by comparing the VC-backed and non-VC-backed companies. They include
in the team building part for example analysis on differences in recruiting practices, human
resource policies, stock option plans and hiring of a vice president of sales and marketing. In
the CEO turnover part of the study focus of the analysis is on hiring an outside CEO, support
versus control in CEO turnovers and the state-contingent nature of venture capital
involvement. The research conducted by Hellman and Puri (2002) clearly identifies the
support function of venture capital in light of multiple organizational milestones, such as the
formulation of HR policies or adoption of stock option plans. Also recruitment of an outside
CEO is often enhanced by venture capitalists supporting a company.
In their recent study on the value added by venture capitalists Bottazzi et al. (2007) suggest
that in addition to monitoring and supporting portfolio companies VCs also have direct
control over some matters in their portfolio companies. Hellman and Puri (2002) also
identified the control function of venture capitalists in addition to the already mentioned
functions of VC.
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As the control function, the support function and the monitoring function clearly fall under
the broader value adding function of venture capital presented by Peneder (2007) we can
picture the different functions of venture capital as presented in the Figure 5 below. This
illustration is not designed as a comprehensive sub-categorization of different aspects of the
value adding function but merely as an illustration of the most relevant functions of venture
capital and their interconnectedness.















2.2 Research on the Value Added by Venture Capitalists
This section focuses on reviewing the academic research and the used methodologies in the
studies concerning the evaluation of the superior performance of VC-backed companies.
According to Alemany and Martí (2005) the explanations behind the added value by venture
capitalists can be divided into three sources: (1) VCs select those companies that have more
potential and whose management is interested in fast growth, (2) VCs add value using
corporate governance to take an active role in monitoring and, when needed, participation for
example through the Board of Directors, and (3) the network of contacts, the portfolio of
companies already invested in and other intangible assets that build up the venture capitalist’s
reputation.
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The literature in this field can be broadly categorized under these different sources of added
value based on the research objective or on the most important conclusions. Of course most of
the more general research identifies multiple sources for added value by venture capitalists
but usually one of these sources is found out to be more important than others.
2.2.1 Value Added through Target Selection
The research conducted in the field of added value through target selection has focused on
how VCs screen and, supposedly, select the best firms in order to understand the process
followed by them. The key assumption behind these studies is that the VCs are able to
identify the best companies and do not often consider the effect that these selection criteria
could have in the posterior development of VC-backed companies (Sepherd and Zacharakis,
2001). Some of the key studies related to the value added through target selection are
summarized in the Table 1.
Table 1: Research Papers related to Value Added through Target Selection
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VC decision making has received tremendous attention in the literature and the results of
various studies show that VC-backed companies survive at higher rate than those ventures
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backed by other sources (Kunkel and Hofer 1991; Sandberg 1986; Timmons 1994).
Nonetheless the failure rate of VC-backed companies is still surprisingly high 20% (Shepherd
and Zacharakis, 2001), which indicates that the decision process is still far from perfect. VCs
try  to  make  sure  they  pick  the  best  companies  from  those  available  but  sometimes  these
ventures fail and presumably not all the successful ventures receive VC financing in the first
place.  Alemany  and  Martí  (2005)  also  point  out  that  VCs  do  not  have  access  to  all  the
companies looking for financing. It is quite clear that VC-backed firms do not perform better
merely because they have been selected by experienced venture capitalists.
The literature identifies that venture capitalists can affect the selection as a ‘‘scout’’ able to
identify potential and as a ‘‘coach’’ that can help realize it (Baum and Silverman, 2004). The
term scout refers to the selection of high potential firms for receiving financing in the first
place and leaving lower potential companies without VC financing. These different roles, that
may exist also simultaneously, are also the root of the problems in identifying the actual value
adding impact over the selection effects that is discussed later in this thesis.
The hypothesis behind the scout role is that rather than waiting for direct selection to
determine  the  success  or  failure  of  a  startup,  investors  rely  on  VCs to  identify  startups  that
give off signals predictive of future success and to enhance the performance of startups that
they select for funding. VCs that acquire effective vicarious selectors thrive as a result, and
successful  selectors  may subsequently  diffuse  through the  VC industry.  VCs thus  shape  the
environment within which new ventures evolve and are themselves subject to selection
processes at a higher level. (Baum and Silverman, 2004)
2.2.2 Value Added through Corporate Governance and Participation
In  general  the  topic  of  venture  capitalists  involvement  in  corporate  governance  and  VC
participation has been studied relatively extensively compared to other research on the effects
of venture capital. This research stream focuses on how VCs use corporate governance to
ensure monitoring of the portfolio companies and how the investors participate in the decision
making and steering of the company for example through the Board of Directors (Sahlman,
1990; Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Gompers, 1995; Lerner, 1995; Kaplan and Strömberg,
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2004). The VCs rights to monitor and participate are usually specified by contracts between
the VC and the portfolio company.
Despite the extensive research about the overall corporate governance and participation of
venture capitalists, the direct impact of these activities for the portfolio companies’
performance has not been studied as much. In the recent years, however, some studies have
been conducted related directly to the value added through these operations (MacMillan et al.,
1989; Hellman and Puri, 2002; Bottazzi et al., 2007). Key studies that seek to identify the
value added through corporate governance and VC participation through the Board of
Directors or through recruiting the management are summarized in the Table 2.
Table 2: Research Papers identifying the Value Added through Corporate Governance
and Participation
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One of the earliest pieces of research that identifies the value added through VC involvement
is the survey research conducted by MacMillan et al. (1989). In their study the researchers
25
conduct a survey to venture capitalists about their involvement in the portfolio companies and
identify three distinct levels of involvement. Their research suggests that some of the VC
involvement, such as development of a support group or conducting monitoring operations
through  the  Board  of  Directors,  result  in  a  positive  correlation  with  performance  of  the
portfolio company. Surprisingly, however, they also found out that VC involvement in the
recruiting of the management resulted in a negative correlation with the company
performance. The study conducted by MacMillan et al. (1989) has several limitations due to
the low response rate of the survey and possible bias caused by this. However, it is one of the
earliest academic studies directly related to the value added through corporate governance and
participation  of  venture  capitalists  and  though  can  be  seen  as  a  pioneer  in  this  field  of  VC
research.
The  often  faced  challenge  in  the  VC  research  based  on  surveys  is  a  low  response  rate  and
possible bias caused by this. Hellman and Puri (2002) have resolved this problem with
handcollected dataset in their research on the impact of venture capitalists on the development
and performance of a new venture. In their research they empirically examine the hypothesis
that venture capitalists foster the development of human capital in start-ups.
Analysis conducted by Hellman and Puri (2002) use a combination of survey and interview
data as well as commercial and publicly available databases. The research focuses on new
private ventures, contrary to most of the existing literature in this field that focuses only on
publicly listed companies because of data constraints. Contrary to papers using only time
series data on the VC-backed companies4, Hellman and Puri (2002) use a control group that
has not received venture capital financing in order to monitor the true added value generated
by VCs. Their main conclusion is that a closely involved investor can have a broad impact on
the development of the companies they finance, suggesting that there are value-added inputs
that venture capitalists provide that go beyond that suggested by traditional financial
intermediation theory.
In the most recent article that identifies significant value added through corporate governance
and participation Bottazzi et al. (2007) obtain four measures of venture capitalists activism
which are involvement in recruiting the management, helping in assembling the board of
4 See e.g. MacMillan et al. (1989), Gompers (1995) and Lerner (1995).
26
directors, assistance in obtaining additional financing and interaction with the portfolio
company. Their survey approach allows construction of several measures of human capital
and  the  analysis  show that  human capital  and  organizational  structure  are  closely  related  to
investor activism.
When assessing the effect of investor activism to performance Bottazzi et al. (2007) face
challenges in both, measurement and identification of the performance. As common in the
research in this field the investor returns are not accessible by the researchers so the
researchers resolve this challenge by measuring performance by whether the invested
companies  experience  a  successful  exit,  defined  either  as  an  IPO  or  an  acquisition.  The
second problem of identification is extended by the possible endogeneity of the simply
regression of exits on investor activism. Bottazzi et al. (2007) seek to resolve this problem by
introducing instrumental variable framework into the analysis and alternatively through a
sample selection model proposed by Heckman (1979) with minor adjustment. In the
instrumental variable framework they use local availability of investor business experience as
an instrumental variable in their analysis. The key identifying assumption behind the logic of
Bottazzi et al. (2007) is that the characteristics of venture capital firms do not affect the
companies’ outcomes directly, but affect them indirectly through their actions, i.e., their level
of activism. Bottazzi et al. (2007) identify a positive relationship between investor activism
and the success of portfolio companies, a finding which highlights the economic importance
of human capital for financial intermediation.
In addition to the specific research identifying the value added through venture capitalists
corporate governance and participation, a wide range of studies focus on venture capitalists
participation on more general level. For example Kaplan and Stömberg (2004) study how the
conflicts between different parties affect the monitoring and participation of venture capital
investors  in  their  portfolio  companies.  These  more  general  studies  are  not  covered  more  in
detail in this literature review.
The studies that identify the value added by venture capitalists through corporate governance
and participation differ often in the way that data is obtained and in the methodologies that are
used. The earlier research on the topic is mostly related to survey data resulting in lower
coverage of the sample than in the other forms for data collection. The earlier research is also
often based solely on VC-backed firms and thus relies on changes over time and differences
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within these companies. More recent studies use more developed methods for both, data
collection and identification of the value added by VCs. These studies implement more
demanding data collection methods with increased data coverage and validity as well as
comparisons between VC-backed and non-VC-backed companies.
2.2.3 Value Added through Intangible Support
The categorization of literature between the value added from corporate governance and
participation and the value added through intangible support is not always easy due to many
studies identifying both sources of added value. However some studies focus clearly solely on
non-traditional ways through which VCs influence their portfolio companies and identify the
value added in these efforts. Key sources for the intangible support and value added that recur
in the literature are VCs network of contacts, VCs reputation and already existing portfolio of
invested companies (e.g. Hochberg et al., 2007; Hsu, 2004; Davila et al., 2003). Some key
studies concerning the value added through the intangibles that venture capitalists offer for
the portfolio companies are summarized in the Table 3.
Table 3: Research Papers related to Value Added through Intangible Support
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One of the earlier academic studies that identify intangible assets VCs bring to the table that
end up adding value to the portfolio companies is the study conducted by Gorman and
Sahlman (1989). They are one of the first academics that focus on how VCs spend their time
with portfolio companies and what happens in the relationship when a portfolio company
faces challenges. This early joint-study conducted by an author from McKinsey & Company
and another from Harvard Business School has also been widely cited in the later studies that
have followed in this field.
The value of the study conducted by Gorman and Sahlman (1989) is not in the use of highly
developed quantitative methodologies – actually they just conduct simple statistical analysis
on the results on their survey. The academic value of their research, taking into account that
the study is conducted already in 1989, lies in the way to conduct a survey to receive a unique
data  and  the  response  rate  that  is  as  high  as  49%.  The  study  exquisitely  addresses  the
relevance of access to unique data as the source of added value in this field of research.
More recent studies focus more explicitly on the added value of the intangible assets that VCs
offer for the portfolio companies. These studies are usually narrower and more focused when
comparing against the earlier literature.
One of the recent studies conducted by Davila et al. (2002) addresses the reputation of venture
capitalist as a possible source of value added in the operations of portfolio companies. They
use unique dataset collected from various databases and methodology drawn from the
signaling theory in order to identify the signaling impact of venture capital investments on the
company growth. With highly sophisticated methodology they identify clear signaling effect
both before the VC investment and when the actual transaction occurs. However, as the data
for the study is collected from the period 1994–2000 mostly from Silicon Valley-based
companies the results can be questionable to some extent. This period has been characterized
as unique and, accordingly, generalizing the results to other time periods should be done with
care. (Davila et al., 2002)
Another intangible asset that is identified in the current literature to add value to portfolio
companies operations is the reputation of the venture capitalist providing financing. A study
conducted by Hsu (2004) focuses on this added value through VC reputation. He uses sample
of portfolio companies that have received multiple financing offers in order to identify
whether reputation of a VC is a decision criteria for the portfolio companies when evaluating
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their alternatives and whether portfolio companies are willing to turn down financially more
attractive offer in order to accept an offer from a VC with better reputation.
The regression study conducted by Hsu (2004) identifies empirically that offers made by VCs
with a high reputation are three times more likely to be accepted, and high-reputation VCs
acquire start-up equity at a 10–14% discount. The evidence suggests that VCs’
“extrafinancial” value may be more distinctive than their functionally equivalent financial
capital. Hsu (2004) concludes that these extra-financial services can have financial
consequences.
One of the most recent studies in the field of VCs’ value adding intangible assets is the study
conducted by Hochberg et al. (2007). The authors conduct a study seeking to identify the
performance consequences of the magnitude of VC’s relationships and networks for portfolio
companies. Their analysis on the syndicate investments and the performance of portfolio
companies suggests that better-networked VC firms experience significantly better fund
performance, as measured by the proportion of investments that are successfully exited
through an IPO or a sale to another company. Similarly, the portfolio companies of better
networked VCs are significantly more likely to survive to subsequent financing and eventual
exit. Based on the strong results by Hochberg et al. (2007) it can be concluded that also
relationships and networks of VCs may add significant value for portfolio companies
operations.
The research in the field of intangible assets that venture capitalists bring to the table, just as
the research about the target selection or corporate governance and participation, shows that
there are multiple ways that venture capital and venture capitalists influence their portfolio
companies. This influence, whether planned or hidden, often adds value to the portfolio
company’s future performance and the window of opportunities may open up for future
success.
However, often even identifying the positive influence may be hard due to the VC selection
effects as well as many forms and ways of VCs operations toward the portfolio companies.
Also the non-public nature of the operations and low availability of data incurs difficulties for
identifying and measuring the value added. The most precious studies in this field are either
conducted using unique datasets that have been received from VCs or collected through
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surveys or implementing methodologies new for this field of research for data from publicly
available databases.
2.3 Research on the Impact of Venture Capitalists
Is it true that venture funded firms are performing better in terms of turnover and employment
growth than non-venture funded firms? Is their innovative output larger than those of their
counterparts not receiving private equity financing? Whereas the studies in the field of added
value try to explain the superior performance of VC-backed companies the research on the
impact  of  venture  capital  seeks  to  identify  the  impact,  whether  positive  or  negative,  on  the
portfolio companies altogether. Researchers have a lot of work to do in the field since it is
challenging to demonstrate the causal relationship between the presence of venture capital and
employment growth, innovation or other impacts (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). The
challenges faced in the impact research are discussed in more detail in section 2.3.4 of this
thesis.
The research on the impact of venture capital belongs to the foundations of the research on
private equity. Logically the identification of the superior performance of the firms should be
a perquisite for the whole research explaining the superior performance of VC-backed
companies. However, the real world is quite different as the value added literature actually
often precedes the impact literature. Also the volume of the value added research clearly
exceeds the volume of impact literature. (Alemany and Martí, 2005)
Alemany and Martí (2005) suggest that current literature on the impact of venture capital can
be grouped in two: (1) specific research in subjects such as innovation and job creation; (2)
studies focusing on a more comprehensive impact of VC-backed firms in the economy. This
categorization is accurate and most of the literature, especially the firm-level studies, seem to
fall under the first category (e.g. Achleitner and Klöckner, 2005; Engel, 2002; Engel and
Keilbach, 2007; Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Romain and van Pottelsberghe, 2004). However,
also the number of more comprehensive studies, especially non-academic studies conducted
by the national and cross-national VC-associations, has been increasing (e.g. Alemany and
Martí, 2005; Global Insight, 2004; EVCA, 2002) as private equity has been a topic of active
public discussion. One recent contribution to this discussion has been a report on the global
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economic impact of private equity published by the World Economic Forum in January 2008
(World Economic Forum, 2008). Usually a common denominator studies falling under the
second impact  study  group is  the  use  of  more  than  only  one  or  few indicators  of  economic
impact. The objective of this thesis clearly categorizes this paper under the comprehensive
impact literature.
Despite the general categorization of literature on the effects of venture capital there are some
recent studies with broader scope than only identifying the impact of venture capital. These
papers combine, at least to some extent, views from both, the current impact literature and
literature on the value added by venture capital (e.g. Peneder, 2007). These studies should not
be left without notice so they are reviewed in this part of the thesis.
2.3.1 Job Creation
Employing people is thought to be positive for the economy and society. Employees pay large
amount of taxes that benefit the whole society, as do the earnings that employees earn while
producing valuable inputs and then use in their day-to-day life. Based on this logic companies
employing lots of people are thus thought to be more beneficial to the economy, especially
when unemployment  is  present  in  the  economy,  than  companies  where  most  of  the  work  is
automated.
Based on the reasoning above the research on the VC-financing and employment growth has
been the most important specific research area within the impact literature. The research has
focused either on the macro-economic estimation of employment growth effects (e.g. Belke et
al., 2003) or on firm-level implications concerning employment growth (e.g. Engel, 2002;
Kjærgaard, 2004). We focus especially on the latter group of research since this thesis is
conducted as a detailed firm-level study covering major part of the VC-backed companies in
Finland during certain period. Some of the most important studies concerning the
employment effects of private equity are summarized in the Table 4.
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Table 4: Research Papers on the Employment Effect of Private Equity
Study Achleitner and
Klöckner, 2005
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As already mentioned, the national and cross-national private equity and venture capital
associations have been active researchers of the impact of private equity. Especially the
European Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (EVCA) has been productive in this
field. The study conducted for EVCA by Achleitner and Klöckner (2005) about the
employment contribution of private equity in Europe is a good example of a study focusing
solely on the contribution of VC on employment.
Achleitner and Klöckner (2005) use statistics provided by EVCA in order to estimate the total
employment contribution of private equity financed companies in Europe. In addition they
conduct an online survey to the VC investors in order to estimate the employment growth in
their portfolio companies. Just as many other papers on the economic and societal impact of
private equity Achleitner and Klöckner (2005) employ statistical analysis on the data without
regression analysis or other more complex research methods. Their main findings on the
employment growth is that private equity financed companies created 1 million new jobs
between 2000 and 2004 and that the employment growth in the private equity financed
companies was eight times the annual growth rate of total employment in the EU 25.
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However, their findings can be, at least partially, questioned due to possible bias occurring
from low response rate of their online survey.
Kjærgaard (2004) examines the impact of VC-financing on firm growth using employment
growth as a proxy for firm growth. His study that uses data from Danish venture capital
market is based on statistical analysis and multivariate regression model. His basic
assumption is that employment growth can be explained by VC funding, company age and
high-tech vs. low-tech division. Kjærgaard uses a control group of firms that have received
equity financing but not venture capital and compares the development of VC-backed
companies to the development in the control group. He finds out that the annual employment
growth in VC-backed companies is 29%, which is six times greater than the average growth
rate for other equity financed companies.
Engel (2002) examines the impact of VC financing on employment growth of new ventures.
He takes an econometric approach for analyzing the employment growth and employs a
German dataset of 632 VC-backed new founded companies that can be included in the
analysis. Engel seeks to tackle the often faced endogeneity problem in the regression analysis
by implementing an extension of Heckman´s (1979) selection approach from univariate
selection to a bivariate selection. Just like Kjærgaard (2004) also Engel (2002) distinguishes
between high-tech and low-tech companies. He finds out that VC-backed companies
employment growth was 42% whereas non-venture-backed companies equivalent growth rate
was only 14%. Based on his analysis he also concludes that pre-investment screening
procedure, provided services and monitoring by venture capitalist affects new firm
employment growth positively.
Employment is clearly an important indicator of economic and societal impact of private
equity. However, the employment growth is not the sole driver of economic growth and
welfare. In many industries the number of employees has been stable or decreased and the
output of the industry has still increased. This is due to productivity, which is another
important driver of economic growth. This suggests that employment should not be used as a
single measure for the impact of private equity.
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2.3.2 Innovation
In the recent years the academic research has seen a rise of the empirical literature studying
the determinants of R&D activities and innovations. However, studies combining the
influence of financing or financial institutions with innovations or innovativeness have been
rare, most likely because of the difficulty of studying the subject (Tykvová, 2000).
Despite the difficulties in studying the subject, the impact of venture capital on innovation has
yielded some studies that enlighten the effect of VC-financing on innovation growth. Just as
in the employment growth section the studies range from macro-economic industry-level
estimations (e.g. Romain and van Pottelsberghe, 2004) to firm-level studies (e.g. Engel and
Keilbach, 2007). The key studies related on VC impact on innovation are summarized in the
Table 5.
Table 5: Research Papers related on the Impact of Venture Capital on Innovation
Study Engel and Keilbach,
2007
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One difficulty in studying VC impact on innovation is finding a reliable measure for
innovation that really leads to the development of new business opportunities or to increases
in the productivity. The number of patents or patent applications is often used without much
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consideration between patents and actual innovation. Patents are used as there is data
available, despite the fact that venture capital may spur patenting without necessarily any
impact on innovation (Kortum & Lerner, 2000). In their study Kortum and Lerner (2005) find
out that companies searching VC-financing may also patent as they want to impress the
potential investors or they may fear that the potential venture investors will exploit their ideas
in some other venture.
Kortum and Lerner (2000) use patent applications as a measure of innovative output of a
company despite the identified challenges. They identify, in addition to other problems, that
patenting  may also  be  related  to  the  arrival  of  technological  opportunities.  As  the  arrival  of
technological opportunities will also lead to higher R&D expenditures Kortum and Lerner
(2000) use R&D expenditures as a control variable of these opportunities.
The study conducted by Kortum and Lerner (2000) adds significant value to the current
research also on considering the methodological side of the analysis and the often causality
problem. They identify that the mechanisms behind the venture capital funding and patenting
and the  extent  to  which  their  estimates  of  the  impact  of  venture  funding  may be  inflated  by
unobserved factors cannot be addressed easily. Due to this possible endogeneity problem
Kortum and Lerner (2000) implement a specific leagal change that has affected the patenting
as an instrumental variable into their equation in order to control for the possible bias in the
equation.
Kortum and Lerner (2000) also take in to account the possibility of companies applying for
VC-financing patenting only to impress the potential investors. They measure the quality of
the patents for example by observing the citations and following law suits. Kortum and Lerner
(2000) find out that VC-financed firms not only receive larger number of patent awards but
also higher scores concerning different value correlated variables. They take these findings as
evidence in favor of the hypothesis that venture funded firms are more innovative, producing
a larger and higher valued stock of patents.
Engel and Keilbach (2007) study the impact of venture capital on growth and innovation of
young German firms. They go along with Kortum and Lerner (2000) in the critique of using
patenting as such as a sole measure of innovation due to three observations, which are (1.) not
all innovations can be patented, (2.) the duration of the patenting procedure is often too long
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for innovation cycle and (3.) patenting procedure discloses some part of the knowledge that is
imbedded in the innovation. Nevertheless, they conclude that patent application is still the
dominant approach to measuring innovative output since it is the most detailed and best
documented data available. Engel and Keilbach (2007) find a significant impact of VC into
firm growth but monitor no significant increase in their innovativeness based on patenting.
Venture funded firms do show significantly larger number patenting applications, but they do
so already before the engagement of a venture capitalist.
Peneder (2007) has conducted a remarkable study on the growth and innovation effects of
VC-financing on Australian companies. He combines data from public databases and his own
survey in order to measure the innovative output not based on patenting but based on a
subjective evaluation by the companies themselves. Peneder (2007) collects a control group
for his study using econometric matching procedure in order to analyze whether the possible
impact of VC-financing arises from the selection and screening process or from actual value
added by VCs.
Based on the results of his survey Peneder (2007) concludes that venture capital backed firms
generally appear to have a stronger orientation towards international markets, a more frequent
introduction of new products, and a greater inclination to protect their innovations. However,
the  observed  differences  in  innovation  performance  prove  to  be  the  result  of  pure  selection
effects and not the direct causal impact of VC-financing on innovation. The latter result
increases the reliability of the study as this result is hard to question with an argument
suggesting biased data.
As presented in this section the innovative output, no matter if measured with patent
applications, R&D expenditures or survey results, is a relevant indicator of economic and
societal impact of private equity. However, the problems associated with all different
measures of innovative output have to be taken into account when assessing the VC impact on
innovation. Also using innovative output as the sole measure of economic and societal impact
would result in a relatively narrow picture on the total impact of VC on economy and society.
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2.3.3 Studies Focusing on the Impact in the General Economy
The impact studies that have focused in the general impact on economy and society in a
broader context have been dominated by the research conducted by/for the different venture
capital and private equity associations. The first impact study, to my knowledge, dates back to
1982 and was undertaken by Venture Economics Inc. (1982) for the US General Accounting
Office. This study was followed by a similar one conducted in the UK in 1987. The problems
in these early studies were the use of limited datasets that represented only less than 10% of
the population and the possible positive bias of the data due to survey method that only
considered the companies that were still in the business and doing well enough to be
interested in reporting their results. These studies also didn´t take the timing of the VC
financing event into account or compare the development of the VC-backed companies
against the development in a control group as the more recent studies do. Some of more
recent studies that have followed are presented in the Table 6.
Table 6: Studies focusing on the Private Equity Impact in General Economy
Study Global Insight, 2007 Alemany and Martí,
2005








What is the economic
impact of Spanish VC-
backed companies?
What is the importance
of venture capital and
its benefits to US
economy?
What is the economic
and societal impact of
VC in Europe?
















? Destination of VC-
funding





(Whole US level, which
is broken down and
analyzed by industry














(Whole US level, which

















Database of over 20
000 companies.
2 908 questionnaires




The recent studies have improved from the earlier days in many ways but the most significant
improvement is the comparison of the results of the private equity-backed companies with
some kind of control group (Alemany and Martí, 2005; Global Insight, 2004, 2007; World
Economic Forum, 2008). However, the research conducted by the private equity and venture
capital associations still often suffers from possibly biased survey techniques and the control
group, if any, is not designed to reflect the nature of the VC-backed companies. These studies
usually benchmark their sample results only to average results of public data (e.g. FTSE-100,
average of private companies, average of industry sectors). This problem arises from very
limited availability of any databases that allow statistical matching or econometric techniques
for defining a control group that would reflect the actual sample.
The research conducted by the academics is usually more evolved methodologically and
control  group  wise  than  the  studies  conducted  by  the  private  equity  associations.  These
studies are still few, but one remarkable academic example is the study conducted by
Alemany and Martí (2005). These researchers, just like many of the earlier reviewed studies
that focus only on one or few measures of economic impact, use a matched control group
against which the development of private equity-funded companies is compared. Alemany
and Martí also use significant number of different measures not focusing only on the
traditional impact measures. Their measures include in addition to the commonly used
employment and sales also total assets, gross margin, corporate taxes and net investment in
intangible assets which is used as a proxy on innovation. In addition to the statistical analysis
on the economic and societal impact Alemany and Martí (2005) also build a regression model
after in order to analyze the actual relationship between private equity funding and
development of various set of measures. They seek to resolve the causality problem resulting
potentially endogenous variables through panel data techniques and the evolution of the
variables compared to the cumulative VC investment.
Alemany and Martí (2005) identify positive economic impact of venture capital for
employment, net sales, gross margin, total assets and intangible assets growth. This impact is
statistically  significant  at  1%  level  for  all  these  variables  except  for  total  assets  and
employment for the companies in the start-up stage. As for the results of their regression
model clear evidence is found of positive impact of the intervention of VCs on employment,
on the volume of total assets and on the amount of corporate taxes paid. On the other hand the
coefficient of the variable that equals 1 while a VC remains as a shareholder in the company
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is positive and significant in the specifications that explain the growth of sales, gross margin,
total assets and intangible assets.
Despite the lack of the evolved selection of control group or modern methodologies, the
recent studies conducted by the private equity associations have some areas where they often
surpass their academic counterparties. These areas are the data quality in terms of absolute
volume and especially the scope of the information that allows analysis to drilldown for
example into specific industry sectors or geographical regions.
Good examples of the studies where the data volume and representation is high and the
analysis drills down into specific industry sectors and regional areas are the Venture Impact-
studies conducted by the Global Insight Inc. (2004 and 2007) for the National Venture Capital
Association. These studies focus on evaluating the impact of venture capital in U.S. economy
and they are conducted in a similar manner updating the basic research scheme with new
information on more than 23 000 companies in every three years. The most recent study
conducted in 2007 concludes that the total revenue of VC-backed companies is 17.6% of the
U.S. GDP and these companies employ 9.1% of the whole U.S. private sector employees. It
also finds out that the annual employment growth was 3.6% and sales growth was 11.8% in
2003-2006 for the VC-backed companies while equivalent growth rates for the total U.S.
private sector were 1.4% and 6.5%.
Also the European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association has researched the impact
of private equity in Europe (2002). The research method in this study is a survey study sent to
the VCs operating in Europe. The applied survey method causes also the major drawbacks of
the study due to the low response rate of 12.5%. The survey method can also result in positive
bias in the dataset because it is likely that only those firms performing well have any interest
in reporting their results (Alemany and Martí, 2005).
The advantage of the survey study method and the research conducted by EVCA (2002) and
is the possibility to collect relatively easily data on various measures of economic impact.
This way the study may approach the economic and societal impact of private equity from
many new directions not just focusing on the traditional employment and sales growth. Some
of these measures are common in the value added literature, such as the involvement of the
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VC and the board composition, but some of them are new altogether. One of these new
measures is for example the use of VC funding within the company.
Maybe the most comprehensive recent report on the societal and economic impact of private
equity is published by the World Economic Forum (2008). Their Global Economic Impact of
Private Equity Report 2008 approaches the global impact of private equity from multiple
directions with various datasets and research methodologies through four previously
unpublished large-sample studies and six private equity case-studies, two of which are from
Europe, two from China and two from India. The large-sample impact studies in the World
Economic Forum report are summarized in the Table 7.
Table 7: Large-sample Impact Studies Published by World Economic Forum in the
Global Economic Impact of Private Equity Report 2008
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The studies published in the report published by the World Economic Forum (2008) are
conducted by the top-of-the-notch core research team lead by Josh Lerner who is a professor
of investment banking at Harvard Business School. The results of the studies build together a
clear and comprehensive cross-section of the global impact of private equity investments.
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Despite the generally high level of the report some published by the World Economic Forum
(2008) notions should be made. Firstly one needs to notice that as the report focuses on the
impact of private equity on the global level the conducted studies do not drill down into
specific  geographical  areas  or  industry  sectors.  Another  attention,  that  is  especially  relevant
for this thesis, is about the used datasets in the large-sample studies: The data for the
conducted studies covers mainly private equity transactions made in the U.S. and the UK.
Also the general problem with possible endogeneity is paid only little attention in the studies
conducted for the World Economic Forum. We can conclude that the report by the World
Economic Forum, despite its significant added value, still leaves considerable room for
further research on the subject.
2.4 Common Challenges in the Impact Literature
The challenges of impact research are not just present when studying the impact of private
equity,  but  in  other  fields  of  impact  research  as  well.  The  main  problems  and  possible
biasedness arises from two issues that are interconnected; the research methods and the choice
of sampling. The more advanced methods have been identified and the methodologies
develop further all the time. These methods can, however, not often be fully employed due to
the need for compromises because of the required data is not available.
This part of the literature review discusses the most common challenges and sources of bias in
the impact literature and the ways that research has employed in order to tackle these
challenges. It also drills down to certain methodological choices made in order to tackle these
challenges.
2.4.1 Selection Bias and Endogeneity
In a private equity context, as Lähdemäki (2007) identifies, a ´selection bias´ does not usually
refer to the researchers mistakes in the sample selection but is a consequence of the dynamics
of the private equity industry and target selectiveness, which make the selection bias
unavoidable.
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As already identified in the sections 2.1 and 2.2 of this thesis the target selection plays a
crucial role in venture capital activities. The venture capitalist has often an opportunity to
choose the company which they will invest in or at least they may refuse to make investments
to any available companies. Through the screening and selection process the companies that
potentially benefit the VCs the most, i.e. the companies that carry superior growth potential,
get financed. The companies that do not receive VC funding may not be started at all or they
face a challenge of obtaining financing from elsewhere. Failing in doing so can result in more
modest growth than their VC-financed counterparties. On the other hand, VC-financed
companies might have got funding from elsewhere and performed as well or even better
without VC funding.
As the selection process of private equity investors is not random and the investments are
based on the predictions of the growth potential the investments decisions done by VCs are
found out to be “endogenous” (Engel, 2002). This issue of endogeneity causes selection bias
at least to some extent in most cases of impact research.
The selection bias caused by the endogeneity of the investment decisions is most obvious
when the development of VC-funded companies is compared against the development of
broad control groups such as the averages of different industries. Engel (2002) however
identifies that the evaluation of the impact during the time of venturing is only possible is
effects resulting from the pre-investment screening procedure are excluded. The bias
decreases when the comparison group is made smaller and more similar to the portfolio
companies but reducing the bias to zero through target selection would mean finding perfect
non-VC-financed matches for each VC-funded company. This is, of course, not possible and
the research thus also employs different econometric analysis techniques in order to tackle the
problem with endogeneity.
Also another kind of selection, namely the self-selection by the companies themselves, can
cause biasedness in the impact research. This occurs when a potential company that could
receive private equity funding decides not to apply for funding because of whatever reason.
The reasons for willing to apply for PE-funding can be many, such as existence of other more
attractive sources of financing or will to retain the full control over the company within the
current owners, and indeed many companies decide not to rely on private equity financing. In
order to completely remove this bias the control group selection should be limited to
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companies that applied but did not receive private equity funding. This, on the other hand,
would result in significantly reduced pool of companies for control group selection.
2.4.1.1 Reducing Selection Biasedness through Control Group Selection
The methodology for defining the control group against which the VC-funded companies are
compared is highly relevant for the problem with endogeneity. In the current research the
methodologies applied for selecting the control group are limited significantly more by the
lack of access to databases that allow the use of sophisticated matching techniques than by the
lack of sophisticated matching methodologies themselves.
The most unrefined methodologies for defining the control group are comparisons of portfolio
company development against the growth in GNP or the aggregated development of different
industries nationally. Lähdemäki (2007) employs comparison against aggregated development
of industries in Finland due to the lack of databases allowing more sophisticated matching.
Industry average comparisons are applied also in the large sample study conducted by Global
Insight (2004) for the National Venture Capital Association in United States due to a sample
of over 26,000 VC-funded companies that would have not allowed more sophisticated
matching.
Kjaergaard (2004) studies the differences between VC-financed and other equity-financed
companies performance in his study. He collects the original data for portfolio companies
from annual reports of Danish VCs and selects the control group from national database of
companies accounting data. He limits the control group to companies that have received non-
venture-capital private equity financing. Comparisons and testing was carried out within
different investment stages and level of technology within the companies. Whereas the
methodology manages to eliminate the self-selection bias well, the actual selection bias in the
analysis is most likely significant due to incomplete matching which does not take for
example the different industries or size of companies into account.
More evolved matching method is introduced by Alemany and Martí (2005) as they identify
the relevance of firm specific industry and size components for selecting the control group. In
their research Alemany and Martí (2005) match each VC-backed company with a non-VC-
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backed company based on four consecutive steps: (1) they pick the companies operating in
the same province, (2) they select the companies with the same activity code, (3) they filter
the companies within the same range of sales and finally (4) they select the company that is
closer in age to that of the VC-funded company. The method applied by Alemany and Martí
(2005) yields good outcomes when there are only few variables to be matched but a question
remains whether these variables are sufficient and all the other variables can be ignored. On
the other hand if the number of variables used in the matching is increased the task of finding
good matches becomes significantly harder.
Peneder (2007) and Engel and Keilbach (2007) use propensity matching for identifying the
control group in their research as this method allows taking multiple variables into account by
estimating the conditional probability to be subject to venture funding for each firm. After this
the matching procedure simplifies to finding for each venture funded firm a non-VC-funded
counterpart through nearest-neighbor matching (Heckman et al., 1999, p. 1953). Peneder
(2007) decides to include the four closest matching companies for each VC-funded company
in the control group, thus increasing the size of the control group. All in all this method is
backed by superior methodological support compared to the previous matching methods.
2.4.1.2 Other Econometric Methodologies for Tackling Selection Bias
Despite the methodological evolution in the control group selection the selection bias cannot
be fully removed through the matching procedure of VC-financed companies to the non-VC-
financed companies. This has led to a quest for other research methodologies, not related
directly to the matching, that can be used to tackle the potential problem with endogeneity.
The classical solution to the selection bias is based on the use of instrumental variable
regression instead of normal OLS regression in the analysis. In this method the defective
explanatory variable is semi-replaced with one that is not correlated with the disturbance
term. In the case of an impact study the instrumental variable would have to be related to the
variables used analyzing the impact but not correlated with the venture capital presence.
Often finding an instrumental variable that meets these qualifications is difficult, especially in
the studies using multiple variables. This methodology has been, however, used for example
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by Bottazzi et al. (2007) in their study on the value added by venture capitalists. They
implement instrumental variable which is often a common choice in the instrumental
variables approach: A measure of the local availability of the selected characteristic. In the
research by Bottazzi et al. (2007) this means instrumenting endogenous experience of selected
individual VC investors by the exogenous local availability of experienced investors in
general.
Another common methodology for solving the problem with sample selection bias is to use a
methodological procedure originally employed by Gronau (1974) but developed further by
Heckman (1979). The Heckman two-step procedure is based on first estimating the omitted
variable,  meaning  the  selection  bias,  from the  results  of  probit  analysis  of  selection.  This  is
followed by second step where the estimated omitted variable is included as an explanatory
variable in the OLS regression equation which now yields consistent estimates. Heckman
(1979) two-step model has been used in VC impact studies for example by Engel (2002). Also
Bottazzi et al. (2007) discuss an extension of this procedure based on the research by
Sørensen (2007) in their analysis.
2.4.1.3 Most Recent Studies Seeking to Overcome Selection Effects
The most recent research methodologies for overcoming the problem caused by non-random
selection are actually more of a total turnaround in the research approach of economic studies
than a treatment solely for this problem. The problem with endogeneity can be avoided if
experiments and selection are random. In the most recent economic studies conducted by
researchers from Harvard University and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) have
begun to champion the latest thing in economics: The randomized evaluations (The
Economist, 12.6.2008).
In these studies different policies are tested by randomly assigning them to different groups
and  thus  no  sample  selection  bias  occurs  in  the  observed  results.  These  randomized
evaluations are a good way for assessing microeconomic questions but are of limited potential
for macroeconomic studies. At least to my knowledge no studies have assessed the impact of
VC financing on economy before and this is clearly a challenging task since randomizing the
selection of investment targets is most likely not a good policy for VC investors willing to
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succeed in their business. Nevertheless a randomized evaluation may succeed in assessing the
impact of VC financing in the future without concern for selection bias or endogeneity.
2.4.2 Survey Bias
Many challenges faced in the research on the impact of private equity are often related to the
data that is used. Often the non-public nature of the private equity data causes problems for
academic research and even the private equity investors and the associations looking after
their interest have limited access to representative datasets. Different surveys are often
employed in order to achieve data for impact research but this method for collecting the data
yields a concern for possible biasedness.
Survey biases may arise from several factors. Questionnaire studies suffer often from a low
response rate and are probably positively biased due to the companies performing well may
be more inclined to answer the questionnaires sent to them. As Alemany and Martí (2005)
also point out that survey bias may be caused also by biased opinions of the person or persons
providing the answers.
2.4.3 Survivorship Bias
Survivor bias results in from the tendency to include to the firm level impact studies,
measuring  the  development  within  certain  timeframe,  only  those  companies  which  were
successful enough to survive until the end of the period. If the failed companies are excluded
from the impact studies because they no longer exist the results of such studies skew higher,
thus, resulting in a positive bias.
In the real life some companies that receive VC-funding are terminated for example through
bankruptcy or an acquisition. Survivorship bias is common due to the fact that many
databases include information only on the existing companies, and when collecting data
through questionnaires only existing companies can provide answers. Many researchers also
leave companies that receive VC financing but fail shortly afterwards out of the analysis
because complete data for their research period is not available. If all the companies that
received VC funding can be included in the research the survivorship bias can be avoided.
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3 Hypotheses
It seems reasonable to argue that if there is a difference in performance between venture
backed and non venture backed companies it should arise from some of the functions by
which VCs can exert an influence towards their portfolio companies. As presented in the
section 2.1.2. Peneder (2007) identifies three broad functions for venture capital.
The first function is the financing function of venture capital. It refers to providing adequate
financial resources for business cases that would have had no access to financing through
traditional sources of capital and thus creating additional value.
Second function, by which VCs can exert an additional influence, is the selection function.
This means the allocation of financial resources to the most profitable uses when uncertainty
and problems of asymmetric information are particularly high. This function is based on an
assumption that the screening and selection process of venture capitalists leads to selecting
the most potential targets for financing. Main reasoning behind this assumption is the vast
experience about the industry, evaluation process and business in general that VCs possess.
The third, and by far the broadest, function by which VCs can exert an influence toward
investee companies is the value adding function. This value adding function refers to the
operations conducted by VC after the investment in order to enhance the growth of the
portfolio company. These operations relate to VCs monitoring or supporting the portfolio
companies operations or taking control over some matters in the company. The value adding
function  is  of  special  interest  here  as  this  thesis  seeks  to  identify  the  actual  economic  and
societal impact of private equity through various firm-level economic measures. The most
severe difficulty will most likely be how to exclude the selection function value adding effect
from the other impact of the various functions.
If VCs have the necessary financial resources, skills and possibilities to participate then this
should lead to:
H1. There is a positive relationship between private equity funding and the growth of sales,
employment, innovation, profitability, total assets, and corporate taxes of a company and the
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differences between the private equity backed companies and non private equity backed
companies are statistically significant.
According to Kjærgaard (2004) the combination of strong specialization and profound
involvement in company management suggests that VCs have a comparative advantage in
handling firms where informational asymmetries are particularly pronounced. The stage of
development is believed to have an impact in this respect.
In fact Kjærgaard (2004) argues that the brevity of an early-stage firm’s track record
aggravates the effects of adverse selection and moral hazard compared to later-stage firms.
Thus, to the extent that VCs are distinctly skilled in mitigating asymmetric information this
should lead to:
H2. The relationship between private equity funding and growth of the chosen firm-level
measures is stronger for early stage companies compared to later stage companies.
Another important classification is made by both Engel (2002) and Kjærgaard (2004). These
studies distinguish between high-tech and low-tech industries in order to validate whether the
impact of private equity is more significant for high-tech industries. The hypothesis in both
studies is that the impact is greater for firms operating in high-tech industries.
The most solid reasoning behind this hypothesis is that a higher risk of insufficient market
acceptance of new products at the market entry leads to more attention, monitoring the
business activities of innovative firms and provided services by venture capitalists or other
investors. Given a positive association between provided services and the performance of the
portfolio company, the impact on firm performance is supposed to be larger in firms with a
high innovation level. Kjærgaard (2004) points out that the informational asymmetries are
also assumed to be more critical for firms in high-tech industries compared to low-tech
industries which should lead to the same conclusion. Therefore, the hypothesis seems to be
testable on the level of industries and is:
H3. The relationship between private equity funding and growth of the chosen firm-level
measures is stronger for companies in high-tech industries compared to companies in low-
tech industries.
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4 Data and Methodology
4.1 Research Approach
This study focuses on analyzing the firm-level impact of private equity as the possible general
economic and societal impact of VCs is supplied though individual companies in which they
invest in. Another possibility would be a macro-economic study but finding suitable data on
venture capitalists activities for this is a challenging task as Finnish VCs do not disclose their
activities or data on them publicly. However, many challenges are also faced in the firm-level
approach.
As presented in the previous sections the general problem with identifying the impact of a
private equity investment (treatment) on a company is that there is no identical company that
did not receive this investment. Of course many companies can be found that did not receive
the treatment and many that did, but the question remains how to reliably identify the actual
impact as these groups differ significantly. This underlines the general problem in treatment
studies and results in this case a problem with endogeneity in the analysis.
The data available for the impact study is non-experimental as the private equity investors
indeed select their portfolio companies carefully. This fact undermines the possibility to use
methods developed for random experiment studies. In random experiments the randomness
has  to  be  present  in  the  experiment  from  the  beginning  and  the  general  method  is  to  use  a
random sample as an input and observe the impact on the output. In this case the private
equity investments would have to be given randomly to companies without them applying for
one and without considering the companies characteristics.
From the  preceding  discussion  on  the  impact  of  private  equity  one  can  easily  conclude  that
tackling the general problem with endogeneity is related to the careful selection of a control
group against which the private equity funded companies are compared. The control group
selection is in this case limited by the availability of Finnish databases that allow the use of
sophisticated control group selection techniques. This research nevertheless succeeds at
defining the control group based on statistical matching that significantly reduces the problem
with endogeneity compared for example to analysis using the industry aggregate development
as a control reference. However, succeeding in the control group selection does not by any
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means completely solve the problem with endogeneity and thus it has to be taken into account
when selecting the analysis methodologies and interpreting the results.
This research is conducted as a firm-level analysis on the impact of private equity investments
but  the  approach  does  not  narrow  down  the  selection  of  the  firm-level  measures  which  we
observe in order to analyze the impact. I will seek to analyze the firm-level impact of private
equity not just based on a single or few measures, as common in the current literature5, but on
a more comprehensive level through various measures. I will include individual firm-level
measures for company size, employment, innovation, profitability, total assets and
government direct income in the analysis as these measures can clearly carry a broad impact
on the Finnish economy and society surrounding the company. Some of the most severe
outliers of the data are excluded from the used data in order to be conservative in the analysis
of the firm-level impact of PE-funding.
4.2 Data
4.2.1 Sample and Data Classification
The chosen sample for this study includes all first-ever private equity investments made by
the full members of FVCA in Finland. Although approximately 40% of the investments made
by these companies are made to companies based abroad this selection was done in order to
narrow the scope of this study solely to the firm-level impact of private equity into Finnish
economy and society.
The companies that received their first-ever private equity investment were chosen as the
sample group in order to monitor the possible changes in the portfolio companies after they
have received private equity financing for the first time ever. In the becoming financing
rounds the impact of private equity is not identifiable as the effect of the new investment is
mixed with the effects from earlier private equity financing rounds. Possible exit was not
considered as also active investments were included in the data. This is logical as the chosen
research method considers the development of the portfolio companies over time – not on the
exit event specifically.
5 See e.g. Achleitner and Klöckner (2005), Kjærgaard (2004), Engel and Keilbach (2007) and Peneder (2007).
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The sample was drawn from first-ever private equity investments that were made between
years 2002 and 2004 and this timeframe was chosen as FVCA data on the first-ever private
equity investments was available only from 2002 onwards. The distribution of the
investments between different years and investment stages is illustrated in the descriptive
analysis sub-chapter 5.2.1 of this thesis. For the actual data collection on the chosen measures
for the sample group only certain databases could be considered as a survey would have
yielded most likely a relatively low response rate. The Finnish databases that are accessible
are certain commercial databases, such as Suomen Asiakastieto´s database, and the enterprise
database of Statistics Finland. Statistics Finland´s database is the only database that also
includes detailed background information about individual companies but the information on
individual companies is concealed because it includes non-public tax administration
information. Commercial databases on the other hand are limited mostly to the accounting
information collected by the National Board of Patents and Registration of Finland and have
no comprehensive background information on the companies.
Survivorship bias is avoided in the research by including all the companies that received their
first-ever  PE investment  during  the  chosen  timeframe.  In  other  terms  the  data  includes  also
companies that have ever since receiving their first-ever PE investment defaulted or otherwise
ceased to exist. Including these companies in the analysis is possible as the potential
databases include the historical financial information on the companies that do not operate
anymore.
The classification of data is based on the investment stage in which different companies
receive their first-ever private equity investment as well as on the primary industry where the
company operates. The aim of the first classification is to seek whether the impact of private
equity  differs  across  different  development  stages  of  portfolio  companies.   Classification  to
different investment stages will be based on two different methodologies (1.) the one
introduced by EVCA (2008) and (2.) the simple categorization to venture capital and buyout
investments as suggested by FVCA. EVCA (2008) classification methodology is presented in
Appendix 2.
The aim of the second classification is to seek whether the impact of private equity differs
between high-tech and non-high-tech industries. In this classification I will use the high-tech
industry sector definition by OECD in order to identify the sample and control group
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companies that operate either in a high-technology manufacturing sector or in knowledge
intensive  services  sector  (Statistics  Finland,  2004).  I  will  consider  both  of  these  sectors
belonging to high-tech industries. In addition to these most relevant classifications data is also
classified based on the age of the companies. This categorization is conducted by the
registration date to the Finnish trade register.
4.2.2 Data Collection and Estimations
The data collection for the study is conducted in four individual steps that are presented in the
Figure 6 below.






















The data collection begins by collecting the basic data on the companies that received their
first-ever private equity investment form a member of FVCA between 2002 and 2004. This
data is collected from the FVCA archives and includes, in addition to the company name and
time of the private equity investment, also information on the investment stage and main line
of operations of the portfolio company.
The next step is to collect the actual data on chosen measures for the VCs portfolio
companies. Taken into account that company level information from Statistics Finland´s
database is not available the commercial databases are the only suitable option. Based on the
53
earlier studies conducted in Finland (Lähdemäki, 2007 and FVCA, 2007) Suomen
Asiakastieto´s database is the most comprehensive database that discloses the needed
company level financial information so this database is selected as a primary data source.
Asiakastieto´s database includes all the annual reports that Finland based companies have
submitted to the National Board of Patents and Registration of Finland.
Data is collected for each portfolio company for the year the company received it´s first-ever
PE investment, the “year 0”, and three consequent years “1”, “2” and “3”. Three year
observation period is chosen because this way we can include all the companies that received
their PE investment between 2002 and 2004 in the sample.  Alemany and Martí (2005) also
find out that the average holding period of private equity investors, although not considered
more in detail in this research, is close to three years. This supports the selection of close to
three year observation period in order to monitor the impact of private equity investment on
the company. The data collected for the sample companies includes data for all the chosen
measures for years 0, 1, 2 and 3 as well as some basic information on the company, such as
the registration date when the company has been added to the Trade Register of Finland
maintained by NBPR.
In the third part of the data collection process the control group companies are defined based
on the methodology fully described and analyzed in the next sub-chapter.
The final part of the data collection is to collect the whole data on chosen measures for the
control group companies from Asiakastieto´s database. The data for each control group
companies is collected for years 2002-2007 and after this the data for years 0-3 of each
control  group  company  is  registered  based  on  the  first-ever  PE  investment  year  of  each
sample group company.
The applied data collection method avoids the concern with selection bias often faced in the
impact literature as the data is collected entirely from databases that are not subject to
questionnaire answers or voluntary disclosure of information. However, some problems are
faced in the quality of the data, mainly due to some companies not reporting their complete
financial information to the NBPR. The reporting to NBPR, despite being mandatory, is not
enforced very well the time series have some gaps and for some companies the data is missing
altogether. The data is supplemented by data from secondary databases, but even after this the
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whole or significant amount of data is missing for about 20% of the sample companies and
they have to be left outside the analysis. In addition the original sample includes four
companies that operate solely as holding companies based on their industry code. These
companies do not report any sales during the observation period and are clearly defined to act
for some special purpose instead of normal business operations. These companies are left out
from the analysis due to their non-normal nature. Finally I will exclude some of the most
severe outliers in the PE-funded companies group from the data in order to receive more
conservative results of the firm-level impact. The total number of companies left out from the
final data due to shoving significantly higher values than the other companies is three.
After the special purpose holding companies, the most severe outliers and the companies with
completely missing or considerably limited data are left out from the sample we are left with
data on 146 companies which represents 77% of the total sample. Compared to survey studies
and impact studies in general this can be considered as a highly representative dataset. There
are, however, some single missing values in the data of these companies as well. This is
especially  the  case  for  a  small  amount  of  companies  that  received  their  first-ever  PE
investment in 2004 and had not yet reported their financial year 2007 data to NBPR as the
data collection took place. For them the values for year 2007, i.e. year 3, are missing. In the
case of one or few missing values in the data the values are estimated based on the estimation
procedure presented in the Table 8 below. Altogether less than 5% of the values have to be
estimated.
Table 8: Estimation of Missing Data Values
This table presents the estimation procedure for missing data values based on the type of missing value and the type of the
company for which the value is missing. Estimation is used only if the missing values can be estimated with high reliability;
otherwise the missing values are not estimated but companies are left out from the final analysis. Estimation procedure is
designed to generate estimates for missing sample company data values that lead to conservative growth rates of estimated
measures.
Type of missing value Estimation procedure
First value missing/zero in case of MBI or MBO First value is considered as the next reported value
First value missing/zero in case of Seed, Start-up or other
early stage
First value is considered as zero
Missing value is between two existing values Missing value is linearly interpolated
Missing value is the last value and company operates Missing value is the last reported value
Missing value is the last value and company does not operate Missing value is zero
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Another challenges faced with the final data are the differences in the financial cycle of
different companies. Indeed, some portfolio and control group companies do not follow the
financial year beginning in January and lasting until December. However, if the duration of
the financial year in these cases is normal, i.e. 12 months, the problem is solved by setting the
actual reported numbers to represent the normal financial year that is closest to the reported
year. For example a reported financial year 1.10.2003-31.9.2004 for a control group company
is considered as match for a sample group company´s financial year 1.1.2004-31.12.2004. If
the reported financial period is irregular in duration, for example 1.10.2003-31.12.2004 due to
a change in the reporting cycle, the data is linearly calibrated to represent 12-month
equivalent. After this the closest normal annual year is considered as a matching reporting
year.
4.2.1 Control Group Selection
The main purpose for a control group in this impact study is to act as a reference against
which the companies that have received private equity investment are compared in order to
identify the effects of private equity investment. Thus the main goal of the control group
selection is to identify a control group that resembles the actual sample as well as possible in
every other aspect excluding PE financing. Success in the control group selection reduces the
general endogeneity problem that is faced in the research on the impact of PE-funding. The
problem with endogeneity cannot, however, be overcome solely through control group
selection as this would require a control group that is identical to the actual sample in every
other aspect than the presence of PE-funding.
Due to the limitations of accessible Finnish databases the most sophisticated econometric
methods, such as propensity score matching used by Peneder (2007) and Engel and Keilbach
(2007), are not applicable for control group selection. Using one of these methods would
require detailed information, such as information on ownership and management structures,
on the portfolio companies and this kind of information is not available in any of the
accessible Finnish databases. Potential source for this kind of more detailed information on
the sample companies could of course be the PE companies themselves but most likely all of
the companies are not willing to disclose information on their portfolio companies. This
would result in reduced the representativeness of the control group.
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Despite some missing values the information in database of Suomen Asiakastieto allows the
statistical matching of sample and control group companies as suggested by Alemany and
Martí (2005). This methodology seems to be next best alternative for propensity score
matching in the evolution PE impact studies. The matching is based on chosen most important
characteristics of sample companies that are considered in consecutive but separate matching
rounds for each individual sample group company in order to narrow down the focus to one
sole suitable match. The matching process is presented in the Table 9 below.
Table 9: Control Group Matching Procedure
This table presents the matching process through which a matching non-private equity financed counterparty is selected for
each individual private-equity funded company of the sample. This methodology is originally applied by Alemany and Martí
(2005) and it is based on several firm characteristics that are considered in consecutive order based on their importance. All
the companies in the actual sample and the control group are registered and operate in Finland.
Matching stage Measure Description
1. Industry Industry code The first stage is to rule out all the companies operating in different industry so
only companies with matching industry codes are considered.
2. Company size Year 0 sales In the second stage the company size is considered and sales in year 0 are
considered as the size measure for each sample group company. Other than the
closest 3-7 non-private-equity-funded companies based on year 0 sales are ruled
out. If there are more than 7 companies in the +/-10% range of year sales these are
narrowed further based on sales but if not, all of these are taken further to the next
step.
3. Company age Registration date The final match is selected based on the company age. Within the 3-7 companies
with year 0 sales closest to the sample company the final match is decided based
on the Trade Register registration date.
Despite Asiakastieto´s database includes all the needed information for the statistical
matching it does not allow direct implementation of this procedure. The challenge is
overcome by first selecting for each sample company a large pool of companies that operate
in the same industry sector i.e. separating a large amount of companies from the first
matching stage. The whole data on these companies is transferred to MS Excel where the
actual statistical matching is conducted.
The matching process does not yield perfect matches for all the PE-funded companies and
especially for companies operating in small industry sectors no perfect matches are found.
Thus, the success in matching the sample group companies with similar non PE-funded
companies based on chosen characteristics has to be analyzed. The results of this analysis are
presented in the Table 10 below. Of course one could also argue that considering only the
company operating region, industry, size and age is not sufficient but these are the most
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profound characteristics that usually differ between companies. Increasing the number of
considered characteristics would also have made it more difficult to find well matching
companies for each sample group company as the number of Finnish companies operating in
specific industries is limited.
Table 10: Successfulness of the Control Group Matching
The success in the control group definition is analyzed by monitoring the differences in main line of operations, the year 0 turnovers and the
registration dates for sample companies and their control group counterparts. The first two columns present the matching stage, the next two
present the average and median sizes and registration dates of the actual sample, the three next columns present the relative differences
compared to the control group and the last three columns present the absolute differences compared to the control group. The conclusions are
that all the companies are matched to a company operating in the same industry, half of the matches differ less than 8.9% in year 0 turnover
and half of the matches differ less than 2.2 years in registration dates. However some matches, especially companies operating in small
industries, differ significantly more than this.
Matching
stage



























23.2.1997 23.3.2000 0.9 years 0.55 years 8.5 years 2.2 years 4.6 years 7.2 years
4.3 Methodology
The methodology part of this thesis can be divided into three separate parts where the first
presents the descriptive analysis on the data, the second studies the observed statistical
differences of selected measures by comparing the development between companies that have
received their first-ever PE investment and their matched counterparties and the third seeks to
identify the association between VC funding and development of these measures through
regression analysis.
The first part of the methodology is relatively straightforward. In the descriptive analysis part
of this thesis begins with industry level descriptive statistics and continues by analyzing the
actual sample data in terms of categorization of companies to different subsamples and
presenting different statistical measures. Also correlations between the actual measures
included  in  the  analysis  are  presented  in  this  part.  The  aim of  the  descriptive  analysis  is  to
provide a good overall picture on the dataset. This is necessary for both conducting the actual
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analysis and the interpretation of the final results as both of these depend highly on the used
data.
4.3.1 Statistical Analysis
The aim of  the  first  actual  analysis  is  to  compare  the  development  between companies  that
received their first ever private equity investment between 2002 and 2004 to the development
of the matched control group. The basic idea is to analyze and compare the development of
these groups within three years following the PE investment. Through the statistical analysis
and testing we can conclude whether the development of chosen measures has been different
for the sample group companies and the control group companies in the chosen timeframe.
This part of the analysis, however, does not take the endogeneity problem into account and
thus does not reliably provide insight on if the PE-funding has actually been the cause of the
observed differences.
Possible exit is not considered and both active and exited investments are included in the data.
This reduces biasedness of the analysis as analyzing the exited companies over a longer
period after the exit would measure the real impact which can be seen to realize in the longer
term. Including all the companies that received the PE investment to the sample also removes
bias caused by the “living dead” companies that are not developing and are held in the
investor´s portfolio to await better times.
The analysis is conducted using multiple firm-level measures on economic and societal
impact for the following three reasons: (1) Including only the most commonly used measures,
such as sales and personnel growth, in the analysis draws a relatively narrow picture on the
economic  and  societal  impact  of  the  development  of  the  company.  (2)  The  studies  on  the
impact of PE on corporate taxes, gross margin, intangible assets and total assets are almost
non-existent.  (3)  Whereas  VC  funding  is  often  shown  to  have  a  positive  impact  on  for
example employment and sales the results for corporate taxes and innovations are often
contradictory (Alemany & Martí, 2005 and Engel & Keilbach, 2007).
I will seek to study company growth, employment, innovation, profitability, total assets and
corporate taxes in this thesis. Development of all these measures can be seen to have a clear
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impact on the surrounding economy and society. However, considering the previous research
on  the  subject,  the  company  size  (sales),  employment  (no.  of  personnel)  and  innovation
(intangible assets) will be the most important measures for the general economy (e.g. Engel,
2002; Engel & Keilbach, 2007 and Peneder, 2007). The Table 11 below describes and defines
the economic measures that are included in the analysis to portray different aspects of firm
level societal and economic impact of private equity.
Table 11: Firm-level Measures of the Economic and Societal Impact of PE
This table presents the different firm-level economic measures that are included in the analysis and the aspects of firm-level




Measure Detailed description of
firm-level measure
Mathematical formula*
Company size Sales growth Absolute growth of sales
0,3, ii SS ?





Innovation Intangible assets growth Absolute growth of
intangible assets 0,3, ii
II ?







Total assets Total assets growth Absolute growth of total
assets 0,3, ii
AA ?










* S=Sales, P=Number of personnel, I=Intangible assets, OP=Operating profit, D=Depreciation and amortization, A=Total assets,
T=Corporate taxes, GM=Gross margin
The  absolute  growth  is  used  for  sales,  personnel,  intangible  assets  and  total  assets.  The
decision to use the absolute growth over the relative growth is based on the fact that the PE-
funded companies are matched to the control group companies by their size (year 0 sales)
among other things as described in the previous chapter 4.2.1. This means that the sample and
control groups are relatively equal in terms of company size, which allows the use of absolute
measures. In addition the use of absolute growth figures over the relative ones is easily
reasoned by the fact that we are willing to observe the firm-level impact of PE to the
surrounding economy and society so the analysis should focus on the absolute impact. Finally
the use of absolute figures can be justified by the fact that the absolute values yield more
conservative growth for the actual sample companies when compared to the control group.
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This is caused by the fact that many of the companies receiving their first-ever PE investment
have just begun their operations so relative growth rates are artificially high.
Balance sheet intangible assets is used as a proxy measure for innovation in the analysis and
this choice can be questioned based on the difficulties at measuring innovation as discussed in
the  subchapter  2.3.2.  However,  the  annual  financial  data  available  does  not  include  data  on
patent applications or other patent measures and the use of patenting as a measure can be
questioned as presented earlier even if the data would be available. The current literature goes
along with the view that also R&D expenditure and net investment to intangible assets capture
relevant aspects of innovative activities of a company even if they cannot be considered as
comprehensive measures on innovation6.
Government direct income from companies plays significant role when assessing the firm-
level impact of private equity to the surrounding society. We employ the cumulative corporate
taxes, as reported in the income statements from year 0 to year 3, as a measure for the direct
government income from a company. The use of cumulative absolute measure is reasoned by
the fact that the amount of paid taxes varies significantly between different years for example
by dropping to zero for one year and increasing again rapidly in the next year. Thus
calculating growth figures or employing taxes from sole year are not reliable options.
Gross margin is used as a measure of profitability for the sample and control group
companies. However, the analysis does not focus on the profitability increase after the PE
investment but rather on the absolute profitability level after three years of the firms have
received their first-ever PE investment. The absolute profitability in year 3 provides us with
more  reasonable  picture  on  the  overall  profitability  of  the  sample  and  control  group
companies than the change from year 0 to year 3 would as many of the companies are
relatively young. Also one can argue that the profitability increase does not yield significant
societal and economic impact if the operation still remains heavily nonprofitable. The
absolute profitability of companies is definitely relevant to the surrounding economy at least
to some extent.
6 See e.g. Kortum & Lerner (2000) and Alemany & Martí (2005).
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All the measures are calculated for each firm in the actual sample and in the control group.
This is followed by conducting a paired sample t-test in order to compare the mean of each
measure between PE-funded companies and their non PE-funded matches. Paired sample t-
test is a dependent t-test and it is used when two groups are matched on a particular variable
or variables as in this case. The test calculates the difference between the matched variables
and uncovers whether the average difference is significantly different from zero. I will
conduct the testing using 95% confidence interval.
For selected firm-level measures also additional analysis is conducted solely within the PE-
funded companies. The additional analysis is conducted in order to observe the differences in
the growth between different sub-categories of the data within the actual PE-funded
companies’ sample. The observed differences are further validated by using two-group t-test.
The comparison between different data categories solely within the PE-funded companies
hopefully helps in the interpretation of the results of other analyses and may validate some of
the findings further.
4.3.2 Regression Analysis
The regression analysis methodology part of this thesis seeks to analyze the actual association
between PE-funding and development of certain firm-level economic measures that are
determined in the earlier chapters. The regression analysis is based on the knowledge and
results from the statistical analysis and I will focus on the measures for which the results in
the previous section yield statistically significant or nearly significant results. All the
measures are defined as presented in the statistical analysis part unless otherwise stated.
In the first part of the regression analysis a basic ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
model without the correction for VC selection process is run for all the included firm-level
measures. Basic OLS regression results provide interesting insight into the development of
PE-funded companies compared to control group companies that includes the selection effects
i.e. the growth potential before the VCs lay any impact on the company. The formulation of
the standard model is as follows:
uXXY kki ????? ??? ...221 (1)
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where
iY is the firm-level economic measure that is analyzed
kXXX ,...,, 21 are the variables included in the analysis
u = error term
The different regression variables employed in the analysis are presented in the sub-chapter
4.3.2.2.
4.3.2.1 Selection Bias corrected Regression Model
The general selection biases deriving from the pre-investment screening procedure of VCs
that cause the endogeneity within the VC impact studies have to be taken into account in the
analysis on the actual value added by the PE investors. I will seek to overcome the problem
by excluding the effects of pre-investment screening and selection process in a formulation of
second regression model in order to reliably evaluate the actual impact of PE-funding.
In order to tackle the selection bias I employ, instead of a normal OLS regression, a two-step
estimation method introduced by Heckman (1979) and already briefly discussed in the sub-
chapter 2.4.1.2. Many variations and extensions of Heckman two-step selection model7 have
been used in the VC impact literature (see e.g. Bottazzi et. al (2007) and Engel (2002)) but the
general principle for the two-step approach remains unchanged. I will first estimate a
selection model of VC-financed companies, whose results are further used in the actual OLS
regression for the value adding impact of VC funding on the chosen firm-level measures.
Engel (2002) states that as VC funding decisions are based on screening the growth potential
of a company, which is in turn determined by firm-specific and management specific
characteristics as well as firm´s environment. The matching process conducted earlier in order
to define the control group should exclude the effects of the firm environment as the
companies are matched to same sized companies operating in the same industry sector. I seek
to follow Engel (2002) on including firm-specific characteristics that are relevant for the VC
7 See e.g. Dougherty, 2007 for through revision of the Heckman two-step procedure
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selection process into a probit model of the VC selection (the first step). This will be difficult,
however, for the dataset at hand as little management specific information is available for the
sample or control group companies. The probit model variables that have been used in the
recent impact literature have been for example the business experience of management team
and the availability of experienced VC investors within certain geographical areas but I have
no access to this kind of information on the sample.
The probit model includes an unobservable (latent) variable *iPE  and an observed variable
iPE . The observed variable iPE  receives value 1 if the company is private equity financed
and 0 if the company is a control group company i.e. has not received PE-funding. The
regression relationship is formulated in terms of *iPE  as follows:
ijiji QPE ?? ??* (2)
where
jiQ = Set of variables affecting probability of company i  to be PE-
funded
i? = Error term
1?iPE for 0* ?iPE
0?iPE  for 0* ?iPE
This further gives probability function
)()1( * ijjii QpPEp ?? ???? (3)
)(1 ijjQF ????
where F is the cumulative distribution function for the error term i? . The probit model












The first step of the two-step process (Heckman, 1979) the Equation 2 is estimated followed









where ? and? are, respectively, density and cumulative distribution function.
The second step of Heckman (1979) procedure is to estimate an OLS model employing the
inverse Mill´s ratio i? as an explanatory variable for the impact of PE-funding.
Defining the variables used in estimating the probability of company receiving PE-funding
causes some concern. The good news in defining the variables is the fact that the variables
concerning the environment the companies operate in can be left out as they are identical for
the sample and control group companies. The challenge is, however, that the firm-specific
variables should ideally be identical to the screening process of VCs when they evaluate a
company for funding. These variables of course differ between VCs and between companies
that are screened. Based on the dataset at hand finding any variables that describe the
qualitative side of company´s operations, such as for example management team experience,
is difficult. However, we have a wide range of quantitative measures on the sample and
control group companies.
The chosen firm-level variables are total assets before the investment, sales before the
investment, number of personnel before the investment, intangible assets before the
investment, gross margin before the investment and sales to balance sheet ratio. The variables
are further defined in the following sub-chapter. All of the chosen measures can be intuitively
seen to potentially affect the VC selection process at least to some extent but not even close to
everything that affects the VC decision can be included in this analysis.
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4.3.2.2 Variables Used in the Regression Models
In this thesis, as presented earlier in this chapter, I will employ two different regression
models for analyzing the sample and control group companies. The first models presented in
Equation 1 are the plain OLS regressions without any corrections for the VC selection effects.
These basic OLS models are referred to as model group 1M . The second model group
consists of OLS models seeking to exclude the selection effects through the Heckman (1979)
two-step procedure as explained earlier. The Heckman models are referred to as 2M  and the
individual steps of the Heckman (1979) procedure are referred to as 12 ?M  (the  first  step)
and 22 ?M  (the second step). The detailed summary on the specifications of the regression
models is presented in the sub-chapter 5.3.1.
The variables used in the first- The following firm-level variables are used in the regression
analysis.
PE : A dummy variable for company private equity funding. Takes a value of 1 if company
has received the first-ever PE investment and thus belongs to the actual sample and 0
otherwise (company belongs to the control group). Used in 1M  and 12 ?M .
i? : Inverse Mill´s ratio, estimated as first-step of the Heckman (1979) two-stage model. This
variable is included in the actual OLS model 22 ?M  in order to overcome the selection bias
arising from the VC selection effects.
00 / AS :  An efficiency  ratio  indicating  how efficiently  the  company generates  sales  on  each
euro of assets. Year 0 numbers before the PE investment are used for calculating the ratio.
Used in 12 ?M .
0GM : Gross margin in year 0. Used in 1M  for gross margin growth as well as in 12 ?M .
0I : Absolute intangible assets in year 0. Used in 1M  for intangible assets growth as well as
in 12 ?M  and 22 ?M .
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0A : Total assets in year 0. Used in 1M  for total assets growth as well as in 12 ?M .
0S : Sales in year 0. Used in 1M  for sales growth as well as in 12 ?M  and 22 ?M .
0P : Number of employees in year 0. Used in 1M  for personnel growth as well as in 12 ?M
and 22 ?M .
INDG : A measure indicating an average growth of the industry for a company of equivalent
size. The measure is calculated for each company by formula XSS ii ?? )( 0,3, where X =
Industry average sales growth percentage from year 0 to year 3. Used in 1M  and 22 ?M .
HIGHMAN : Is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if company operates in high
technology manufacturing industry sector and zero otherwise. Used in 1M  and 22 ?M .
KNOWSER : Is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if company operates in knowledge
intensive services sector and zero otherwise. Used in 1M  and 22 ?M .
SEED : Is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for PE-funded companies seed
investment stages as well as for matched control group companies of these seed stage
companies and zero otherwise. Used in 1M  and 22 ?M .
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5 Analysis and Results
5.1 Descriptive Analysis
This chapter summarized the key properties of the data. The first sub-chapter presents broad
industry-level statistics seeking to describe the Finnish PE industry in general. Considering
the final sample the properties presented are the actual time of PE investments categorized to
the corresponding investment stages, the sample distribution across different data categories,
the overall data statistics from the time of the PE investment (year 0) for sample and control
group, and finally the correlations between the economic measures used in the actual analysis.
5.1.1 Industry Level Descriptive Statistics
The first descriptive analysis seeks to present some industry-wide statistics in order to
describe the Finnish PE industry in general from the PE-funded companies’ perspective. The
data used in this section includes altogether 179 companies that received their first-ever PE
investment between 2002 and 2004 for which the year 0 and year 3 figures could be
calculated or reliably estimated. This is more than in the actual comparative analysis in the
following sections as the analysis in this part does not include any comparison to the control
group companies and the measures included are only sales, personnel, corporate taxes and
total assets. Thus, not as many companies have to be dropped out due to data constraints and
also the outliers that are not included in the actual analysis are included in this descriptive
part.
The 179 companies included in this section represent 94% of all the companies that received
their first-ever PE investment between 2002 and 2004 and due to this high representation the
figures describe the whole Finnish PE industry from the portfolio companies perspective
relatively well. Figure 7 presents the total sum of sales and Figure 8 the sum total assets for
PE-funded companies at the time of the PE investment and three years after the investment.
The tables are categorized to different investment years in order to monitor the annual
magnitude of the investing activities.
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*Includes 94% of the total new Finnish portfolio companies  during the selected period























*Includes 94% of the total new Finnish portfolio companies  during the selected period
From  the  graph  we  can  identify  the  vast  growth  of  sales  and  total  assets  of  the  portfolio
companies on the industry level. We can also see that the growth of the portfolio companies
that received the investment in 2004 has been fastest, i.e. during the observation period from
year 2004 to 2007. The faster growth can at least partially be explained through the overall
slowdown in the Finnish and global economy and investments in 2000-2003. Figures 9 and 10
present the same kind of industry level analyses for employment and corporate taxes. The
same general conclusions can be drawn also from these tables.
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*Includes 94% of the total new Finnish portfolio companies  during the selected period
The general remark about the new portfolio companies of Finnish based PE investors is that
the portfolio companies clearly have an importance for the Finnish economy in terms of
overall economic activity, employment effect as well as corporate tax income. Generally the
magnitude seems to increase after the PE investments but we cannot draw conclusions based
on this analysis on whether PE-funding is the actual source of this growth.
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5.1.2 Investments at Different Investment Stages
The final sample includes 146 companies that received their first-ever PE investment and can
be included in the further analysis. These investments divide relatively evenly between the
investment years 2002, 2003 and 2004. The investments can be further divided into different
investment stages according to the EVCA classification which is presented in the Appendix 2.
The yearly investments categorized to EVCA investment stages are presented in the Figure 11
below.




























One can easily observe that early stage investments, which include the seed, start-up and other
early-stage investments, sum up to 74 investments. This represents 51% of the final sample.
Mid-stage investments represent approximately 25% and later stage buyout investments
approximately 24% of the total sample.
In comparison to recent years the sample seems to represent the general division of Finnish
first-ever PE investments between early-, mid- and late-stage investment relatively well.
During the year 2007 the number of the early-stage investments is 53%, the mid-stage 20%
and the late-stage 27% of the total first-ever PE investments (FVCA, 2008). Of course one
should notice, that in financial terms the late-stage investments dominate the market as the









5.1.1 Distribution of Investments across Industry Sectors
The distribution across different industry sectors depends on how narrow definition is used at
defining different industry sectors. The distribution in this case is also dependent on for which
purpose the industry classification is done. Figure 12 presents a general distribution among
different industry sectors for a purpose of simply portraying the qualities of the final sample.
For this purpose the industry sector definitions are used as presented in the Statistics Finland´s
standard industrial classification published in 2002 (Statistics Finland, 2002). I will, however,
split the professional services further to IT services, R&D services and other professional
services due to their high numbers.












For purposes of analyzing H.3 I will need another distribution across different industry sectors
as defined earlier in the sub-section 4.2.1. Figure 13 presents the distribution of first-ever PE
investments to high-tech sectors, namely high-tech manufacturing and knowledge intensive
services, and low-tech sectors. More than 75% of the sample companies classified to the
knowledge intensive services sector operate in software-, IT- and medical R&D sectors.
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The sample distributions clearly highlight the fact that relatively high proportion of the first-
ever PE investments are made to IT services and/or knowledge intensive services sectors.
Almost half of the investments are, however, made to the industrial manufacturing sector.
Only three investments are made to education, healthcare or social services sectors, which
emphasizes the fact that these services are in Finland governmentally organized and financed
to a high extent.
The  next  distribution  will  be  based  on  the  age  of  the  PE-funded  companies.  The  Figure  14
presents the age of the PE-funded companies based on their registration dates to the Finnish
trade register. We can easily see that most of the companies are relatively young at the time
they receive their first ever PE investment as more than 50% of the companies that received
their first-ever PE investment between 2002 and 2004 have been founded in the 21st century.
One should, however, notice that the registration date is not fully reliable measure of
company age as some of the companies may have begun operating in real terms before the
registration. Also a VC may have made the investment decision in some cases before the
registration date especially within the seed investment stage.
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5.1.1 Investment Year Key Statistics
Table 12 summarizes the central descriptive statistics regarding the used firm-level measures
of economic and societal impact of PE-funding. The statistics are combined from companies´
figures for the year that sample companies have received their first-ever PE investment and
thus they are so-called year 0 values. The statistics are presented for both sample and control
group separately.
Table 12: Year 0 Key Statistics
This table presents the central descriptive statistics regarding the used firm-level measures of economic and societal impact
of PE-funding. The statistics are combined from companies´ figures for the year that sample companies have received their
first-ever PE investment and thus they are so-called year 0 values. Gross margin for year 0 is not presented as it can be
calculated for relatively low number of companies due to zero values. The statistics are presented for both sample and
control group separately.
N Mean St. Dev. Min 1st quart. Median 3rd quart. Max
Sales (k€)
Sample group 146 4,911 11,649 0 52 480 4,044 85,714
Control group 146 4,387 11,438 0 78 478 3,724 100,510
Personnel
Sample group 146 43 96 0 3 10 37 810
Control group 128* 29 54 0 2 6 37 415
Intangible assets (k€)
Sample group 146 6,122 15,931 0 294 1,113 4,590 134,089
Control group 146 4,086 14,581 3 40 332 2,316 144,554
Corporate taxes (k€)
Sample group 146 85 328 -61 0 0 7 2,807
Control group 146 48 105 -49 0 3 33 603
Balance sheet (k€)
Sample group 146 1,127 5,839 0 3 60 235 56,262
Control group 146 753 6,657 0 0 0 18 78,424
*18 control group companies do not report the number of personnel to the NBPR as part of their annual figures
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5.1.1 Correlations between the Measures
Table 13 presents the correlation coefficients between different measures used in the analysis
as defined in the sub-chapter 4.3.1.
Table 13: Correlations between the used Measures
This table presents the correlations between different measures used in the analysis as defined in the sub-chapter 4.3.1. The
interpretation of correlation coefficient depends on the context and purposes but generally in social sciences a correlation
between 1.0 and 0.5 (-1.0 and -0.5) can be considered a high positive (negative) correlation, a correlation between 0.5 and 0.3
(-0.5 and -0.3) can be considered a medium positive (negative) correlation and a correlation between 0.3 and 0.1 (-0.3 and -0.1)














Personnel growth 0.67 1.00
Intangible assets growth - 0.22 0.15 1.00
Cumulative taxes 0.54 0.19 - 0.03 1.00
Total assets growth 0.37 0.44 0.40 0.39 1.00
Year 3 Gross Margin 0.05 0.02 - 0.02 0.05 0.01 1.00
The table above shows high positive correlation between sales growth and personnel growth
as well as cumulative taxes. This is natural as usually the number of personnel increases as
the firm sales increase. Increased sales also may lead to higher profit which in turn increases
the corporate taxes.
Medium positive correlation can be identified between the increase in total assets and sales,
personnel and intangible assets growth. Total assets growth has also medium positive
correlation with cumulative taxes. Correlations between the growth of total assets and
company other growth figures are easily intuitively reasonable.
The most interesting findings are the low correlation of year 3 gross margin figure with any of
the other economic measures as well as the low negative correlation between sales growth and
intangible assets growth. Year 3 gross margin may have a low correlation since it is a static
profitability measure calculated solely for one year of the observation period. This measure




This part of the thesis presents the statistical analysis on the development of the firm-level
economic measures between the PE-funded companies and the control group. Conducted
statistical analyses present reliably the actual observed differences between these two groups
and thus lead the way for more detailed regression analyses. The most relevant observations
are rationalized and additional analyses are conducted when necessary.
5.2.1 Company Growth
Table 14 presents the average absolute sales growth for the sample group companies and
control group companies three years after the first-ever PE investment. The table also presents
the p-value of the paired-sample dependent t-test in order to define if the difference between
the means for the selected timeframe is statistically significant. The first, and the most
important, notice for the results is that for the whole sample the average growth of PE-funded
companies has been close to four-fold when compared to the control group companies. The
difference is statistically significant at 99.9% confidence level.
The results across different sub-categories are in line with the general finding about
statistically significantly greater mean growth for PE-funded companies. For later stage
investment, especially MBOs and MBIs the difference in means in absolute terms is larger
than for earlier investment stages. For earlier investment stages the mean growth on the other
hand is relatively larger when compared to control group companies.
For companies that have been founded before the year 1995 the average growth seems
actually almost equal between the sample and the control group without a clear explanation.
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Table 14: Year 0 - Year 3 Average Sales Growth
This table presents the average growth of sample and control group sales from year 0 to year 3 as well as the result of the paired
sample dependent t-test in the form of p-value. This p-value presents the probability that the mean for the actual sample is lower
than the corresponding mean for the control group. P-value of less than 0.05 indicates a statistically significantly higher sample
group mean at 95% confidence level(*), p-value less than 0.01 a statistically significantly higher sample group mean at 99%
confidence level(**) and p-value less than 0.001 a statistically significantly higher sample group mean at 99.9% confidence
level(***).
Average Growth (k€)
N PE-funded Non-PE-funded p(Non-PE > PE)
All Firms 146 4,652 1,264 0.0001***
By Industry Affiliation
High Technology Manufacturing 33 8,724 3,028 0.0166*
Other Manufacturing and Construction 34 3,271 1,482 0.0469*
Knowledge Intensive Services 56 2,522 52 0.0074**
Other 23 6,035 1,361 0.0635
By Investment Year
2002 46 4,889 932 0.0114*
2003 47 3,516 698 0.0110*
2004 53 5,453 2,054 0.0182*
By Founding Year
Before 1995 40 1,648 1,830 0.5774
1995 - 1999 30 4,736 1,567 0.0042**
2000 - 2002 41 4,435 788 0.0237*
After 2002 35 8,267 914 0.0025**
By EVCA Investment Stage
Seed 42 532 90 0.0004***
Start-up 18 735 553 0.3622
Other Early stage 14 646 53 0.0500*
Expansion 35 5,610 619 0.0130*
MBI 10 5,134 1,641 0.0784
MBO 24 13,700 4,609 0.0147*
By FVCA Investment Stage
VC 111 2,371 322 0.0026**
Buyout 34 10,900 3,736 0.0066**
Based on the results across the industry sectors one may notice that the difference and it´s
significance is greater also for companies operating in high-tech industries than for companies
operating in other industries. This means that PE-funded companies operating in high-tech
industries grow even faster than other PE-funded companies when compared to control group.
These results would suggest that for this sample group H.2 and H.3 seem to hold for the
selected time period when it comes to the absolute sales growth comparison to the control
group companies.
An analysis focusing solely on the PE-funded companies could enlighten the observed
differences further and provide help in the interpretation the results. A statistical analysis on
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the relative sales growth solely within the PE-funded companies sample is presented in the
Table 15.
Table 15: Year 0 - Year 3 Relative Sales Growth within PE-funded Companies
This table presents the average relative sales growth within PE-funded companies for different data
categories. Two-group t-test is conducted for each data category for comparison of means. As the sales is
for many of the PE-financed companies low for year 0 the growth rates are on average high and the standard
deviations are large. Thus, none of the differences arises to statistical significance despite large differences
in relative average sales growth across the categories.
N Average growth % p(0 > I)
All Firms 143 1102% -
By Technology Affiliation
High-tech Industries (I) 86 1156% 0.4302
Other Industries (0) 57 1021%
By EVCA Investment Stage
Seed (I) 40 1006% 0.5634
Other (0) 103 1139%
Expansion (I) 35 1580% 0.2338
Other (0) 108 947%
MBO  (I) 24 1826% 0.1925
Other (0) 119 956%
Start-up (I) 17 218% 0.8072
Other (0) 122 1221%
Other Early stage (I) 14 56% 0.8214
Other (0) 129 1216%
MBI (I) 10 1343% 0.4300
Other (0) 129 1084%
By FVCA Investment Stage
VC* (I) 108 928% 0.7922
Buyout (0) 35 1637%
*VC stage = following EVCA investment stages: Seed, Start-up, Expansion and Other Early stage
The above analysis is conducted using the relative growth figures instead of the absolute
growth, as the companies differ substantially in size across industry sectors and investment
stages. Relative growth has to be used as these differences are not corrected by matching the
companies with same sized counterparties when focusing solely on the PE-funded companies.
Within the PE-funded companies there seems to be clear differences in average growth rate of
sales only between VC and buyout investments. However, not even this difference is close to
a statistical significance so this further analysis reveals only little about the possible
differences in the relative growth rate within the PE-funded companies.
Based on the statistical analysis on firm-level sales growth we can conclude that the average
growth for companies that have received PE-funding is statistically significantly greater than
78
for the matched control group companies during the observation period. We can also conclude
that for our sample the differences are larger for early-stage and high-tech companies when
compared to the matched control group. Nothing fully explicit can be said, however, on the
possible general relationship between PE-funding and sales growth solely based on this
statistical  analysis.  Sales,  being  undoubtedly  one  of  the  most  important  measures  for  firm-
level economic and societal impact, should definitely be included in the regression analysis
part as well.
5.2.2 Employment
Table 16 presents the average absolute personnel growth for the sample group companies and
control group companies three years after the first-ever PE investment. The table also presents
the p-value of the paired-sample dependent t-test in order to define if the difference between
the means for the selected timeframe is statistically significant. The most relevant finding is,
similarly to the sales growth in the previous sub-chapter, that the mean personnel growth for
PE-funded companies is statistically significantly higher at 99.9% confidence level. The mean
for companies that have received their first-ever PE investment between 2002 and 2004 is in
this sample over to six-fold compared to the control group.
For personnel growth the variance within the sample is larger than for sales growth. Thus the
difference between the means does not reach statistical significance for all the sub-categories.
Within the knowledge intensive services sector the difference is, however, statistically
significant and for high-tech manufacturing sector the difference is closer to statistical
significance than for the other industry sectors.
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Table 16: Year 0 - Year 3 Average Personnel Growth
This table presents the average growth of sample and control group personnel from year 0 to year 3 as well as the result of the
paired sample dependent t-test in the form of p-value. This p-value presents the probability that the mean for the actual sample is
lower than the corresponding mean for the control group. P-value of less than 0.05 indicates a statistically significantly higher
sample group mean at 95% confidence level(*), p-value less than 0.01 a statistically significantly higher sample group mean at
99% confidence level(**) and p-value less than 0.001 a statistically significantly higher sample group mean at 99.9% confidence
level(***).
Average Growth (persons)
N PE-funded Non-PE-funded p(Non-PE > PE)
All Firms 124 14.1 2.1 0.0009***
By Industry Affiliation
High Technology Manufacturing 29 12.8 3.9 0.0819
Other Manufacturing and Construction 32 13.1 2.4 0.1219
Knowledge Intensive Services 44 15.4 0.4 0.0139*
Other 19 14.7 2.7 0.0608
By Investment Year
2002 40 21.8 0.1 0.0024**
2003 38 10.4 2.7 0.1584
2004 46 10.5 3.4 0.0676
By Founding Year
Before 1995 37 7.5 4.8 0.2693
1995 - 1999 25 14.6 1.9 0.1102
2000 - 2002 34 22.2 0.7 0.0062**
After 2002 28 12.5 0.3 0.0672
By EVCA Investment Stage
Seed 33 5.2 0.4 0.0182*
Start-up 14 -2.4 -2.4 0.4947
Other Early stage 13 4.6 0.1 0.0827
Expansion 32 31.5 2.3 0.0056**
MBI 9 9.6 3.2 0.1248
MBO 21 19.8 9.2 0.2078
By FVCA Investment Stage
VC 94 13.3 0.4 0.0010**
Buyout 30 16.7 7.4 0.1540
Also for early stage VC investments the difference in means and the statistical significance is
substantially higher than for the later stage buyout investments. The difference between the
FVCA defined investment stages seems even higher than for the sales growth in the earlier
sub-chapter. Again these findings seem to be in line with H.2 and H.3 for this sample.
An analysis focusing solely on the PE-funded companies could enlighten the observed
differences  further  and  provide  help  in  the  interpretation  the  results.  Thus,  I  will  conduct  a
similar  analysis  focusing  only  on  the  PE-funded  companies  as  earlier  with  sales  growth.  A
statistical analysis on the relative personnel growth solely within the PE-funded companies is
presented in the Table 17.
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Table 17: Year 0 - Year 3 Relative Personnel Growth within PE-funded Companies
This table presents the average relative personnel growth within PE-funded companies for different data
categories. Two-group t-test is conducted for each data categories for comparison of means. As the number
of employees is for many of the PE-financed companies low for year 0 the growth rates are on average high
and the standard deviations are large. Thus, none of the differences arises to statistical significance. The
number of observations is higher than in the Table 16, since in the earlier analysis a number of matched
pairs had to be left out due to a control group company not reporting the number of employees to the NBPR.
N Average growth % p(0 > I)
All Firms 143 244% -
By Industry Affiliation
High-tech Industries (I) 86 218%
0.6644
Other Industries (0) 57 283%
By EVCA Investment Stage
Seed (I) 40 269%
0.4169
Other (0) 103 234%
Expansion (I) 35 322%
0.2760Other (0) 108 218%
MBO  (I) 24 327% 0.3083
Other (0) 119 227%
Start-up (I) 17 139%
0.6971
Other (0) 122 258%
Other Early stage (I) 14 101%
0.7353
Other (0) 129 259%
MBI (I) 10 112%
0.6855Other (0) 133 254%
By FVCA Investment Stage
VC* (I) 109 238%
0.5597
Buyout (0) 34 264%
*VC stage = following EVCA investment stages: Seed, Start-up, Expansion and Other Early stage
The above analysis is conducted using relative figures in order to bypass the bias arising from
differences  in  sizes  of  the  sample  companies.  For  employee  growth  this  additional  analysis
reveals even less than for the sales growth as the means are close to each other and
significance levels for differences are low.
We can conclude the statistical analysis on the personnel growth by stating that the average
growth for companies that have received PE-funding is statistically significantly greater than
for the matched control group companies during the observation period. We can also conclude
that for our sample the differences are larger for VC investment stage and knowledge
intensive services sector when compared to the matched control group. On the general
relationship between PE-funding and employee growth little certain is revealed. Employment
is an important firm-level measure for economic and societal impact of PE and the results of
these analysis supports inclusion of employment also in the regression analysis.
81
5.2.3 Innovation
Table 18 presents the average absolute balance sheet intangible assets growth for the sample
group companies and control group companies three years after the first-ever PE investment.
The table also presents the p-value of the paired-sample dependent t-test in order to define if
the difference between the means for the selected timeframe is statistically significant.
Table 18: Year 0 - Year 3 Average Intangible Assets Growth
This table presents the average growth of sample and control group intangible assets from year 0 to year 3 as well as the result of
the paired sample dependent t-test in the form of p-value. This p-value presents the probability that the mean for the actual sample
is lower than the corresponding mean for the control group. P-value of less than 0.05 indicates a statistically significantly higher
sample group mean at 95% confidence level(*), p-value less than 0.01 a statistically significantly higher sample group mean at
99% confidence level(**) and p-value less than 0.001 a statistically significantly higher sample group mean at 99.9% confidence
level(***).
Average Growth (k€)
N PE-funded Non-PE-funded p(Non-PE > PE)
All Firms 145 61 -318 0.0937
By Industry Affiliation
High Technology Manufacturing 33 -495 -1,219 0.2664
Other Manufacturing and Construction 33 -52 -6 0.7269
Knowledge Intensive Services 56 620 5 0.0101*
Other 23 -342 -261 0.5753
By Investment Year
2002 46 -104 -996 0.1514
2003 47 -33 -27 0.5117
2004 52 291 18 0.0513
By Founding Year
Before 1995 40 -40 -138 0.1859
1995 - 1999 30 156 -1,141 0.1273
2000 - 2002 41 9 -160 0.3745
After 2002 34 157 5 0.3258
By EVCA Investment Stage
Seed 42 199 7 0.0040**
Start-up 18 163 2 0.0525
Other Early stage 14 -5 -1 0.5331
Expansion 34 -128 -74 0.5379
MBI 10 102 -655 0.1366
MBO 24 134 -114 0.3523
By FVCA Investment Stage
VC 110 58 -20 0.3304
Buyout 34 124 -273 0.2118
The analysis suggests that the mean for PE-funded company´s intangible assets growth for the
whole sample is larger than the mean for the control group but the difference is not
statistically significant. The difference, however, reaches statistical significance for
knowledge intensive services sector and for the seed investment stage just as in the earlier
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sub-chapters with sales and personnel growth. In this case the higher growth rate for seed
investment stage might be due to the fact that despite the matching with control group
companies is based also on the registration date no perfect match based on this criterion is
found for every seed investment stage company. This is merely because the sample includes
some seed-stage companies which are founded only few months before the PE investment.
I will conduct the drilldown analysis focusing solely on the PE-funded companies also for
relative intangible assets growth. The results are presented in Table 19 below.
Table 19: Year 0 - Year 3 Relative Intangible Assets Growth within PE-funded
Companies
This table presents the average relative intangible assets growth within PE-funded companies for different
data categories. Two-group t-test is conducted for each data categories for comparison of means. The
number of observations is smaller than earlier due to some PE-funded companies having zero sales in year
0.
N Average growth % p(0 > I)
All Firms 127 1134% -
By Industry Affiliation
High-tech Industries (I) 74 1718% 0.0789
Other Industries (0) 53 318%
By EVCA Investment Stage
Seed (I) 32 2045%
0.1400
Other (0) 95 827%
Expansion (I) 33 1537%
0.3129
Other (0) 94 992%
MBO  (I) 23 115%
0.8361Other (0) 104 1359%
Start-up (I) 16 1281% 0.7861
Other (0) 111 111%
Other Early stage (I) 12 161%
0.7488
Other (0) 115 1240%
MBI (I) 8 2583%
0.2216
Other (0) 119 1037%
By FVCA Investment Stage
VC (I) 96 1257%
0.3290
Buyout (0) 31 752%
The relative growth analysis focused on the actual sample companies suggests that the mean
innovation growth for the high-tech industries is higher than the mean growth for other
industries. The mean difference is large also for earlier investment stages than for later ones.
None of these differences is, however, statistically significant.
We can conclude the statistical analysis on the intangible assets growth by stating that the
average growth for companies that have received PE-funding is not statistically significantly
83
different from the control group companies without PE-funding. Despite this general
conclusion the differences seem statistically significantly larger for knowledge intensive
services industry sector and seed investment stage PE-funded companies.
5.2.4 Government Direct Income
The growth of government direct income i.e. the firm-level corporate taxes is analyzed in the
Table 20. The table presents the cumulative corporate taxes for the next three years after the
initial PE investment and compares the cumulative taxes to the control group. The table also
presents the statistical test results similarly to other economic measures presented in the
previous sub-chapters.
Table 20: Year 0 - Year 3 Average Cumulative Corporate Taxes
This table presents the average cumulative corporate taxes of sample and control from year 0 to year 3 as well as the result of the
paired sample dependent t-test in the form of p-value. This p-value presents the probability that the mean for the actual sample is
lower than the corresponding mean for the control group. P-value of less than 0.05 indicates a statistically significantly higher
sample group mean at 95% confidence level(*), p-value less than 0.01 a statistically significantly higher sample group mean at 99%
confidence level(**) and p-value less than 0.001 a statistically significantly higher sample group mean at 99.9% confidence
level(***).
Average Growth (k€)
N PE-funded Non-PE-funded p(Non-PE > PE)
All Firms 146 306 238 0.2303
By Industry Affiliation
High Technology Manufacturing 33 665 530 0.3548
Other Manufacturing and Construction 34 344 234 0.1731
Knowledge Intensive Services 56 80 42 0.1723
Other 23 283 299 0.5301
By Investment Year
2002 46 359 238 0.3159
2003 47 204 150 0.2170
2004 53 348 315 0.3863
By Founding Year
Before 1995 40 129 384 0.9607
1995 - 1999 30 720 291 0.1171
2000 - 2002 41 164 143 0.4184
After 2002 35 318 116 0.0474*
By EVCA Investment Stage
Seed 42 0 11 0.9944
Start-up 18 77 164 0.8922
Other Early stage 14 16 120 0.9856
Expansion 35 159 133 0.6448
MBI 10 166 398 0.8338
MBO 24 1,032 790 0.2282
By FVCA Investment Stage
VC 111 70 106 0.9043
Buyout 34 777 675 0.3334
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The main finding is that the average cumulative corporate taxes between PE-funded and non
PE-funded companies, despite looking larger for PE-funded companies, is not statistically
significant. This finding gives little spur for deepening the analysis on the subject and thus we
can conclude that the cumulative taxes are not statistically significantly affected by the
presence of PE investor within the first three years after the investment.
The fluctuations in the average cumulative taxes observed across different investment years
are not noteworthy but across different founding years the fluctuation seems remarkable.
These fluctuations, however, may be due to random variation or the fact that the analysis
assumes the control group companies to be founded in the exactly same year as the
corresponding PE-funded companies they are matched to. This is not exactly the case for
every company as pointed out in the sub-section 4.2.1.
It would be interesting to analyze the relative growth of corporate taxes within the PE-funded
companies between different investment stages as done earlier with sales, personnel and
intangible assets growth in sub-sections 5.2.1-5.2.3. However, the corporate taxes fluctuate
between different years heavily and for many companies the year 0 value is zero this cannot
be done. The nature of corporate taxes is also rather discrete between different years which do
not support relative growth analysis.
5.2.5 Total Assets
The average growth of total assets from year 0 to year 3 is presented in the Table 21 below.
The testing is conducted with t-test for paired sample in a similar manner as for other firm-
level measures.
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Table 21: Year 0 - Year 3 Average Total Assets Growth
This table presents the average growth of sample and control group total assets from year 0 to year 3 as well as the result of the
paired sample dependent t-test in the form of p-value. This p-value presents the probability that the mean for the actual sample is
lower than the corresponding mean for the control group. P-value of less than 0.05 indicates a statistically significantly higher
sample group mean at 95% confidence level(*), p-value less than 0.01 a statistically significantly higher sample group mean at
99% confidence level(**) and p-value less than 0.001 a statistically significantly higher sample group mean at 99.9% confidence
level(***).
Average Growth (k€)
N PE-funded Non-PE-funded p(Non-PE > PE)
All Firms 146 910 108 0.0552
By Industry Affiliation
High Technology Manufacturing 33 282 367 0.5195
Other Manufacturing and Construction 34 939 383 0.1612
Knowledge Intensive Services 56 1,282 154 0.0149*
Other 23 860 -782 0.1241
By Investment Year
2002 46 996 -1,090 0.0377*
2003 47 -39 349 0.7016
2004 53 1,676 934 0.1387
By Founding Year
Before 1995 40 421 -259 0.1542
1995 - 1999 30 1,312 88 0.2339
2000 - 2002 41 908 312 0.1153
After 2002 35 1,124 307 0.2543
By EVCA Investment Stage
Seed 42 500 70 0.0055**
Start-up 18 427 -169 0.2069
Other Early stage 14 161 413 0.7611
Expansion 35 1,071 -648 0.0448
MBI 10 1,474 649 0.1414
MBO 24 963 2,111 0.7314
By FVCA Investment Stage
VC 111 707 -128 0.0084
Buyout 34 1,113 1,681 0.6661
The conclusion is that the mean for PE-funded company´s total assets growth for the whole
sample is larger than the mean for the control group but the difference is not statistically
significant as also in the case of intangible assets. However, the difference in mean
approaches statistical significance so the result is not completely evident. Similarly to the
intangible assets the difference in means of total assets reaches statistical significance for
knowledge intensive services sector and for seed investment stage.
I will further analyze the possible differences within the PE-funded companies as presented
also for sales, personnel growth and intangible assets in the Table 22.
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Table 22: Year 0 - Year 3 Relative Total Assets Growth within PE-funded Companies
This table presents the average relative total assets growth within PE-funded companies for different data
categories. Two-group t-test is conducted for each data categories for comparison of means. P-value of less
than 0.05 indicates a statistically significantly higher sample group mean at 95% confidence level(*), p-
value less than 0.01 a statistically significantly higher sample group mean at 99% confidence level(**) and
p-value less than 0.001 a statistically significantly higher sample group mean at 99.9% confidence
level(***).  P-value  of  more  than  0.95  indicates  a  statistically  significantly  lower  sample  group  mean  at
95% confidence level(*).
N Average growth % p(0 > I)
All Firms 146 74% -
By Industry Affiliation
High-tech Industries (I) 89 87%
0.1363Other Industries (0) 57 55%
By EVCA Investment Stage
Seed (I) 42 144% 0.0009***
Other (0) 104 46%
Expansion (I) 35 73% 0.5147
Other (0) 111 75%
MBO  (I) 24 15%
0.9666*
Other (0) 122 86%
Start-up (I) 18 28%
0.8887Other (0) 128 81%
Other Early stage (I) 14 42% 0.7699
Other (0) 132 78%
MBI (I) 10 48% 0.6906
Other (0) 136 76%
By FVCA Investment Stage
VC (I) 112 89%
0.0282*
Buyout (0) 34 25%
The results of the drilldown analysis focusing solely on the PE-funded companies sample are
different compared to the earlier drilldown analysis on other firm-level economic variables.
The most substantial difference is that the average relative total assets growth is statistically
significantly higher at 99.9% confidence level for companies receiving PE financing in seed
investment stage. After few thoughts one can easily see the reasoning behind this: In the case
of seed financing the founded company has most likely few or no assets in the balance sheet
and the PE investment will boost up the balance sheet extensively especially in relative terms.
We can conclude from this sub-chapter that the average total asset growth for companies that
have received PE-funding is not statistically significantly different from the control group
companies. The difference, however, approaches statistical significance. Despite this general
conclusion the differences seem statistically significantly larger for knowledge intensive
services industry sector and seed investment stage PE-funded companies.
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5.2.6 Profitability
Profitability  is  analyzed  by  the  year  3  gross  margin  as  the  use  of  growth  figure  is  not
reasonable as argued in the sub-section 4.3.1. The comparative analysis between PE-funded
companies’ profitability and the control group is presented in the Table 23 below.
Table 23: Year 3 Average Gross Margin
This table presents the average gross margin of sample and control group companies in year 3 as well as the result of the paired
sample dependent t-test in the form of p-value. This p-value presents the probability that the mean for the actual sample is lower
than the corresponding mean for the control group. P-value of more than 0.95 indicates a statistically significantly lower sample
group mean at 95% confidence level(*), p-value more than 0.99 a statistically significantly lower sample group mean at 99%
confidence level(**) and p-value more than 0.999 a statistically significantly lower sample group mean at 99.9% confidence
level(***).
Average year 3 gross margin %
N PE-funded Non-PE-funded p(Non-PE > PE)
All Firms 137 -52% 15% 0.9982**
By Industry Affiliation
High Technology Manufacturing 33 -54% 14% 0.9541*
Other Manufacturing and Construction 33 -29% 21% 0.8901
Knowledge Intensive Services 50 -86% 11% 0.9701*
Other 21 -7% 16% 0.9748*
By Investment Year
2002 44 -44% -3% 0.8599
2003 42 -38% 38% 0.9606*
2004 51 -72% 11% 0.9808*
By Founding Year
Before 1995 40 -32% 34% 0.9617*
1995 - 1999 25 4% -17% 0.2676
2000 - 2002 39 -55% 9% 0.9673*
After 2002 33 -171% 23% 0.9753*
By EVCA Investment Stage
Seed 38 -155% -11% 0.9858*
Start-up 14 -62% 13% 0.8033
Other Early stage 13 -79% 88% 0.9166
Expansion 35 7% 16% 0.9829*
MBI 10 11% 15% 0.8735
MBO 24 10% 15% 0.8342
By FVCA Investment Stage
VC 102 -74% 15% 0.9979**
Buyout 34 10% 15% 0.9000
Statistical analysis on the year 3 gross margin yields an interesting and extraordinary result.
The conclusion is that the profitability of the PE-funded companies is on average lower three
years after receiving the PE investment compared to the control group. The result is
significant at a 99% confidence level for the whole sample and generally holds well also for
different sub-categories. An interesting finding is the fact that the average gross margin is
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even lower for the sub-categories, i.e. for seed investment stage and knowledge intensive
services sector, than for other data categories. These are the same companies that enjoy
comparatively even greater absolute sales and personnel growth figures than other PE-funded
companies.  The  result  presents  a  new  question  of  whether  the  VCs,  especially  in  early
investment stage companies and within knowledge intensive services sector, seek higher
growth of sales and are willing to sacrifice the profitability, at least for the first three years
after their investment.
I will begin deepening the analysis, as also in the earlier sub-chapters, by analyzing the year 3
gross margins within the PE-funded companies across different data categories as presented in
the Table 24.
Table 24: Year 3 Gross Margin within PE-funded Companies
This table presents the average year 3 gross margin within PE-funded companies for different data
categories. Two-group t-test is conducted for each data categories for comparison of means. P-value of
more than 0.95 indicates a statistically significantly lower sample group mean at 95% confidence level(*),
p-value more than 0.99 a statistically significantly lower sample group mean at 99% confidence level(**)
and p-value more than 0.999 a statistically significantly lower sample group mean at 99.9% confidence
level(***).
N Average % p(0 > I)
All Firms 137 -52% -
By Industry Affiliation
High-tech Industries (I) 83 -73%
0.8895
Other Industries (0) 54 -21%
By EVCA Investment Stage
Seed (I) 38 -155%
0.9990***
Other (0) 99 -13%
Expansion (I) 35 7%
0.0484
Other (0) 102 -73%
MBO  (I) 24 10% 0.0852
Other (0) 113 -66%
Start-up (I) 14 -62%
0.5618
Other (0) 123 -51%
Other Early stage (I) 13 -79%
0.6614
Other (0) 124 -49%
MBI (I) 10 11% 0.1995
Other (0) 127 -57%
By FVCA Investment Stage
VC (I) 103 -73% 0.9572*
Buyout (0) 34 10%
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The result of the year 3 gross margin suggests that indeed the earlier investment stage
companies that often operate in the high-tech industries, enjoy lower profitability than other
PE-funded companies. The fact that the year 3 gross margin is significantly lower for early
investment stage PE-funded companies than their matched counterparties with similar
industry and age suggests looking the time before the year 3. I will conduct a similar analysis
as presented for year 3 in the table 22 also for the investment year 0. The results are presented
below in the Table 25.
Table 25: Year 0 Average Gross Margin
This table presents the average gross margin of sample and control group companies in year 0 as well as the result of the paired
sample dependent t-test in the form of p-value. This p-value presents the probability that the mean for the actual sample is lower
than the corresponding mean for the control group. P-value of more than 0.95 indicates a statistically significantly lower sample
group mean at 95% confidence level(*), p-value more than 0.99 a statistically significantly lower sample group mean at 99%
confidence level(**) and p-value more than 0.999 a statistically significantly lower sample group mean at 99.9% confidence
level(***).
Average
N PE-funded Non-PE-funded p(Non-PE > PE)
All Firms 127 -106% 16% 0.9999***
By Industry Affiliation
High Technology Manufacturing 32 -150% 16% 0.9919**
Other Manufacturing and Construction 31 -46% 19% 0.8985
Knowledge Intensive Services 42 -151% 18% 0.9917**
Other 22 -39% 7% 0.9531*
By EVCA Investment Stage
Seed 30 -310% 6% 0.9986**
Start-up 14 -208% 23% 0.9651*
Other Early stage 13 -104% 29% 0.8621
Expansion 34 -1% 12% 0.9046
MBI 9 9% 18% 0.8801
MBO 24 2% 21% 0.9034
By FVCA Investment Stage
VC 93 -146% 14% 0.9999***
Buyout 34 4% 20% 0.9356
Based on the analysis above one can easily observe that the profitability difference between
the PE-funded companies and control group companies, especially for the earlier investment
stages, is rooted in a profitability difference also in the investment year 0. The results clearly
show that the companies that have received PE-funding are on average not as profitable, in
terms of gross margin, as their matched counterparties. This result is quite intuitive as venture
capitalists often state their willingness to change companies they finance. However, the
questions on the future development of the profitability and growth vs. profitability remain. I
will try to analyze the future development of the profitability focusing solely to the companies
that have received their first-ever PE investment in 2002 as described below.
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The Figure 15 below describes the gross margin for PE-funded companies that received their
first-ever PE investment in 2002 and which operate in knowledge intensive services sector.
The R&D sector, however, has to be left out from the knowledge intensive services sector due
to large amount of gaps in the gross margin data for years after the year 3. This increases the
gross margins for this group.
Figure 15: Average Gross Margin Development from Year 0 to Year 5
This chart presents the average gross margin for PE-funded companies operating
in knowledge intensive services sector that have received their first-ever PE
investment during 2002. The average is presented for year 2002 and the five
following years. The companies operating in R&D industries are, however, left out
due to serious gaps in their gross margin data after the year 2. This increases the
overall average gross margin. Altogether 12 companies are included in the
analysis
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Based on this simple analysis on just 12 companies belonging to the selected sub-category
few general conclusions can be drawn about the profitability of the PE-funded companies
after the year 3. However, within this small group the profitability seems to increase later in
time. Of course, one should notice that few companies operating in R&D industry sector had
to be left out from this analysis due to serious gaps in the data.
On general level we can conclude that the companies receiving PE-funding are less profitable
than their counterparties as they receive PE-funding. This difference is even larger for
recently founded companies. The difference remains three years after the PE investment but
the difference for later investment stage companies has become smaller. The profitability of
PE-funded early investment stage companies remains low.
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5.3 Regression Analysis
5.3.1 Regression Model Specifications
The OLS regression models used in the analysis are presented in the Table 26 below. The
firm-level economic measures that are included in 2M  are  selected  based  on 1M  results.
This means that cumulative corporate taxes as well as year 3 gross margin are dropped out as
the impact of PE-funding is not significant based on the basic OLS regression ( 1M ) results.
Table 26: The Detailed Specifications of the OLS Regression Models
This table presents the regression model specifications for each model group and firm-level economic impact that is
explained through regression model. Some of the variables in the model groups are left out in some of the models within each
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The specification of the regression equations with multiple variables brings out the question
of  possible  complications  that  may  affect  the  reliability  of  the  results.  The  two  possible
complications that the regression equations in this case may suffer from are possibilities of
multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity. Intuitively the variables that are chosen should not
affect the variance of the error term which, hence, can be assumed constant. Following
conclusion is that the regression should not suffer from heteroscedasticity.
Multicollinearity, however, has to be tested by calculating the correlation between some of
the explanatory variables. The table 27 presents correlations between the explanatory
variables. As a conclusion year 0 total assets is dropped off from all the 2_2M  equations as
the correlation is significant with year 0 personnel and year 0 intangible assets. After this
none of the equations include both year 0 personnel or intangible assets and year 0 total assets
as the correlation between these measures is significantly high. In addition the regressions
might suffer from some multicollinearity also between year 0 sales and year 0 personnel, but
the level of multicollinearity should not affect the results severely.
Table 27: Correlation between Independent Variables
This table presents the correlations between the independent variables employed in the regression models. The Year 0 total assets are not
included in the same model as year 0 personnel or year 0 intangible assets as these correlations are high and might cause a problem with





























Services 0.03 -0.42 1
Seed investment
stage 0.03 -0.01 0.36 1
Industry growth
variable 0.06 0.14 -0.18 -0.15 1
Year 0 Sales -0.00 0.22 -0.29 -0.25 0.46 1
Year 0 Personnel 0.09 0.21 -0.25 -0.25 0.65 0.68 1
Year 0 Intangible
Assets 0.02 0.16 -0.11 -0.09 0.11 0.51 0.59 1
Year 0 Total Assets 0.05 0.20 -0.21 -0.20 0.51 0.68 0.82 0.75 1
5.3.2 Basic OLS Regression Results
The results of the 1M  regression models are presented in the Table 28 below.
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Table 28: Results of the Absolute Growth Basic OLS Regression Models
This table presents the results of the basic OLS regression models in the model group 1M . The first column presents
the different variables employed in the models. The next two columns present the estimated coefficient and the p-
value of model 1 within 1M .  The  next  two  columns  present  the  estimated  coefficient  and  the  p-value  of  model  2
within 1M . The final two columns present the estimated coefficient and the p-value of model 3 within 1M .
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefficient p Coefficient p Coefficient p
Sales growth Adj. R²=0.322, n=292 Adj. R²=0.317, n=292 Adj. R²=0.098, n=294
PE-funded 3.05E+06 0.000*** 3.04E+06 0.000*** 3.39E+06 0.000***
High Technology Manufacturing 1.97E+06 0.080 3.63E+06 0.005**
Knowledge Intensive Services 1.22E+06 0.241 -1.39E+05 0.907
Seed investment stage -1.71E+06 0.093 -3.60E+06 0.002**
Industry growth variable 1.87E-01 0.013* 1.94E-01 0.011*
Year 0 Absolute Value 3.22E-01 0.000*** 3.38E-01 0.000***
Constant -7.70E+05 0.349 -4.29E+05 0.481 1.53E+06 0.092
Personnel growth Adj. R²=0.107, n=248 Adj. R²=0.111, n=248 Adj. R²=0.035, n=248
PE-funded 1.01E+01 0.008** 1.01E+01 0.007** 1.20E+01 0.002**
High Technology Manufacturing 2.99E-01 0.951 1.90E+00 0.709
Knowledge Intensive Services 5.44E+00 0.248 3.19E+00 0.509
Seed investment stage -4.04E+00 0.391 -8.48E+00 0.076
Industry growth variable 6.91E-07 0.122 -7.21E-07 0.105
Year 0 Personnel 1.68E-01 0.000*** 1.67E-01 0.000***
Constant -2.39E+00 0.520 -1.39E+00 0.614 2.78E+00 0.441
Intangible Assets growth Adj. R²=0.800, n=290 Adj. R²=0.7994, n=290 Adj. R²=0.023, n=290
PE-funded 5.07E+05 0.000*** 5.08E+05 0.000*** 3.79E+05 0.199
High Technology Manufacturing 3.86E+04 0.831 -7.45E+05 0.060
Knowledge Intensive Services 2.95E+05 0.076 3.88E+05 0.288
Seed investment stage -2.25E+05 0.164 1.60E+05 0.652
Industry growth variable 3.02E-03 0.783 1.89E-03 0.860
Year 0 Intangible Assets -3.60E-01 0.000*** -3.61E-01 0.000***
Constant -1.06E+05 0.410 -4.69E+04 0.623 -3.45E+05 0.220
Total Assets growth Adj. R²=0.206, n=292 Adj. R²=0.193, n=292 Adj. R²=-0.001, n=292
PE-funded 1.08E+06 0.017* 1.06E+06 0.021* 8.02E+05 0.114
High Technology Manufacturing 8.65E+05 0.158 1.08E+04 0.987
Knowledge Intensive Services 2.15E+05 0.701 5.23E+05 0.405
Seed investment stage -1.32E+06 0.017* -5.22E+05 0.392
Industry growth variable -1.45E-02 0.731 -6.87E-03 0.871
Year 0 Total Assets -1.33E-01 0.000*** -1.23E-01 0.000***
Constant 7.68E+05 0.079 6.17E+05 0.060 5.50E+04 0.909
Cumulative Taxes Adj. R²=0.521, n=292 Adj. R²=0.516, n=292 Adj. R²=0.058, n=292
PE-funded -2.37E+04 0.479 -4.61E+04 0.544 6.79E+04 0.520
High Technology Manufacturing 7.87E+04 0.080 3.69E+05 0.010*
Knowledge Intensive Services 5.47E+03 0.895 -9.25E+04 0.480
Seed investment stage -5.07E+04 0.213 -3.31E+05 0.010*
Industry growth variable 6.51E-03 0.018* 1.56E-02 0.011*
Year 0 Corporate Taxes -1.03E-01 0.143 2.68E+00 0.000***
Constant 4.29E+04 0.184 9.29E+04 0.088 2.85E+05 0.005**
Year 3 Gross Margin Adj. R²=0.364, n=246 Adj. R²=0.33658, n=246 Adj. R²=0.062, n=274
PE-funded -2.25E-01 0.270 -2.13E-01 0.295 -6.72E-01 0.003**
High Technology Manufacturing 1.09E-01 0.665 -3.37E-02 0.907
Knowledge Intensive Services 2.81E-02 0.910 -2.66E-02 0.923
Seed investment stage -3.69E-01 0.154 -8.76E-01 0.001**
Industry growth variable -1.05E-09 0.944 2.56E-09 0.861
Year 0 Gross Margin 4.39E-01 0.000*** 4.51E-01 0.000***
Constant 1.81E-01 0.333 1.25E-01 0.372 4.09E-01 0.052
Statistically significant at *95%, **99% and ***99.9% confidence level.
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The results of the basic OLS regression models without any correction for the selection
effects seem to be mostly in line with the main conclusions from the statistical analysis part
presented in the chapter 5.2 of this thesis. The most relevant finding to be further analyzed
through the selection bias corrected regression model is the statistically significant association
between PE-funding and sales, personnel, intangible assets and total assets growth. For sales
and personnel growth the results seem even more robust than for intangible or total assets.
As the selection effects are not excluded we cannot say anything yet especially about the
valued adding impact of VCs but we can conclude that the companies that have received PE-
funding  do  grow  faster  in  terms  of  sales,  personnel,  intangible  assets  and  total  assets.  This
faster growth is due to one of the functions of venture capital presented in the Figure 5 earlier
in this thesis but we cannot identify the exact sources of this faster growth.
There, however, seems to be no association whatsoever between PE-funded and non-PE-
funded companies in terms of cumulative taxes or gross margin three years after the PE
investment.  The  lower  profitability  of  the  PE-funded  companies  three  years  after  the
investment is  explained to a great extent by lower profitability levels also at  the time of the
investment.
The  sales  growth  from year  0  to  year  3  are  positively  related  to  the  sales  in  year  0  and  the
personnel increase from year 0 to year 3 is positively related to the number of personnel in
year 0. Sales growth is also positively related with the industry development. Furthermore
intangible assets growth is positively related to year 0 intangible assets. These results are
quite easy to intuitively understand. However, the growth of total assets seems to be
negatively related to the total assets in year 0. This finding is statistically significant at 99.9%
confidence level so there results cannot be easily questioned.
In order to validate the basic OLS regression outcomes further I will conduct analysis with
basic OLS regression on the relative percentage growth of sales, personnel, intangible assets
and total assets. The employed OLS regression models are identical to the Table 28 OLS
regression model except that the dependent variable is changed to the relative growth instead
of absolute growth. These results are, however, not as reliable as those presented in the Table
28 as the number of observations is significantly lower due to the lack of relative growth
figures for many companies. Also the standard deviations are higher and the goodness of fit-
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figures as well as number of observations lower than in the previous analysis. The results of
the relative growth regression models are presented in the Table 29 below.
Table 29: Results of the Relative Growth Basic OLS Regression Models
This table presents the results of the basic OLS regression models for the relative growth dependent variables in
the model group 1M .  The  first  column  presents  the  different  variables  employed  in  the  models.  The  next  two
columns present the estimated coefficient and the p-value of model 1 within 1M . The next two columns present
the estimated coefficient and the p-value of model 2 within 1M . The final two columns present the estimated
coefficient and the p-value of model 3 within 1M .
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefficient p Coefficient p Coefficient p
Sales growth Adj. R²=0.035, n=286 Adj. R²=0.0245, n=286 Adj. R²=0.016, n=286
PE-funded 2.02E+01 0.004** 2.02E+01 0.003** 1.98E+01 0.004**
High Technology Manufacturing 1.54E+00 0.868 -1.23E-01 0.989
Knowledge Intensive Services 3.18E-01 0.971 1.65E+00 0.846
Seed investment stage 1.95E+00 0.818 3.88E+00 0.641
Industry growth variable -2.42E-07 0.696 -2.46E-07 0.689
Year 0 Sales -3.01E-07 0.389 -3.10E-07 0.351
Constant 1.32E+00 0.845 2.39E+00 0.634 -9.42E-01 0.884
Personnel growth Adj. R²=0.038, n=248 Adj. R²=0.036, n=248 Adj. R²=0.034, n=248
PE-funded 2.08E+00 0.002** 2.07E+00 0.002** 1.94E+00 0.003**
High Technology Manufacturing -1.16E+00 0.180 -1.25E+00 0.146
Knowledge Intensive Services -1.41E+00 0.087 -1.20E+00 0.143
Seed investment stage 8.16E-01 0.323 1.15E+00 0.155
Industry growth variable -3.16E-08 0.687 -2.42E-08 0.757
Year 0 Personnel -9.03E-03 0.156 -9.09E-03 0.137
Constant 9.38E-01 0.151 3.76E-01 0.437 5.26E-01 0.338
Intangible Assets growth Adj. R²=0.027, n=188 Adj. R²=-0.001, n=188 Adj. R²=0.004, n=188
PE-funded 9.89E+00 0.156 1.09E+01 0.114 9.82E+00 0.157
High Technology Manufacturing 7.98E+00 0.350 7.26E+00 0.387
Knowledge Intensive Services 6.62E+00 0.446 6.91E+00 0.422
Seed investment stage 6.03E+00 0.512 6.58E+00 0.469
Industry growth variable -1.89E-07 0.667 -1.91E-07 0.662
Year 0 Intangible Assets -1.89E-07 0.667 -1.79E-07 0.678
Constant -2.89E+00 0.665 2.01E+00 0.717 -3.42E+00 0.601
Total Assets growth Adj. R²=0.020, n=292 Adj. R²=-0.006, n=292 Adj. R²=0.006, n=292
PE-funded -1.30E+00 0.357 -1.24E+00 0.383 -1.29E+00 0.357
High Technology Manufacturing -4.42E-01 0.817 -4.32E-01 0.818
Knowledge Intensive Services 1.34E+00 0.444 1.33E+00 0.445
Seed investment stage 2.56E+00 0.138 2.55E+00 0.133
Industry growth variable 1.26E-08 0.924 -1.17E-08 0.929
Year 0 Total Assets -1.38E-09 0.980 -2.32E-08 0.666
Constant 8.77E-01 0.520 2.14E+00 0.036 8.91E-01 0.504
Statistically significant at *95%, **99% and ***99.9% confidence level.
The results of the relative growth OLS regression models seem to yield the same conclusions
as the absolute growth models for association of PE-funding and sales as well as personnel
growth. However, for intangible assets and total assets growth the result shows no association
with PE-funding. The year 0 figures are in general terms not explanatory for the relative
growth figures as they were for the absolute growth.
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All in all the results of the basic OLS regression analyses suggest further analysis for sales,
personnel, intangible assets and total assets growth with the model seeking to correct the
selection effects through Heckman (1979) two-step procedure. This analysis seeks to more
reliably verify the impact of the value adding function of venture capital on these firm-level
measures.
5.3.3 Heckman Two-step Model Results
The Heckman (1979) regression model procedure seeks to validate the actual impact of PE-
funding on the financed companies. The first-step is used to estimate the inverse Mill´s ratio,
which is further used in the second-step OLS regression models as an explanatory variable to
exclude the selection effects from the regression model and in order to seek to identify the
actual value adding impact of PE-funding.
The variables used in estimating the inverse Mill´s ratio are, as already explained in the sub-
chapter  4.3.2.2,  sales  to  balance  sheet-ratio  as  well  as  year  0  absolute  values  for  sales,
personnel, intangible assets, total assets and gross margin. These variables are chosen as they
can be seen to affect the selection of VCs at least to some extent. The difficulty in
implementing the Heckman (1979) two-step OLS regression is how to identify numeric
measures affecting the actual selection of VCs. As everything included in the selection
process cannot be explained by observing numeric measures the results of this analysis cannot
be fully reliably concluded to reflect the value added of PE-funding. This analysis, however,
seeks to exclude the selection effects as well as possible and clearly yields insight into the
association between PE-funding and the development of the funded companies.
Table 30 presents the results for the Heckman (1979) two-step OLS regression models.
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Table 30: Results of the Heckman Two-step OLS Regression Models
This table presents the results of the Heckman two-step procedure OLS regression models in the model group 2M . The first
column presents the different variables employed in the models. The next two columns present the estimated coefficient and
the p-value of model 1 within 2M . The next two columns present the estimated coefficient and the p-value of model 2 within
2M . The final two columns present the estimated coefficient and the p-value of model 3 within 2M . The variables used in
estimating the Inverse Mill´s ratio are sales to balance sheet-ratio as well as year 0 absolute values for sales, personnel,
intangible assets, total assets and gross margin.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefficient p Coefficient p Coefficient p
Sales growth Wald chi2=142***, n=242 Wald chi2=136***, n=242 Wald chi2=139***, n=242
Inverse Mill´s ratio 5.45E+06 0.028* 5.44E+06 0.022* 4.49E+06 0.067
High Technology Manufacturing 3.03E+06 0.101 3.41E+06 0.069
Knowledge Intensive Services 2.71E+06 0.132 3.09E+06 0.091
Seed investment stage -1.69E+06 0.394 -2.52E+06 0.201
Industry growth variable -1.01E-01 0.447 -1.21E-01 0.368
Year 0 Sales 2.60E-01 0.003** 2.52E-01 0.003** 3.65E-01 0.000***
Year 0 Personnel 3.32E+04 0.057 3.76E+04 0.030*
Year 0 Intangible Assets 7.26E-01 0.000*** 7.02E-01 0.000*** 9.72E-01 0.000***
Constant -2.83E+06 0.172 -1.64E+06 0.325 -1.86E+06 0.358
Personnel growth Wald chi2=34***, n=227 Wald chi2=31***, n=227 Wald chi2=27***, n=227
Inverse Mill´s ratio -2.73E+00 0.848 4.01E+00 0.762 -5.16E+00 0.719
High Technology Manufacturing 1.40E-01 0.989 3.69E-01 0.971
Knowledge Intensive Services 1.19E+01 0.231 1.28E+01 0.207
Seed investment stage -1.40E+01 0.211 -1.85E+01 0.095
Industry growth variable -8.50E-07 0.296 -8.42E-07 0.306
Year 0 Sales -6.21E-07 0.307 -7.03E-07 0.246 -1.98E-07 0.654
Year 0 Personnel 2.09E-01 0.054 2.38E-01 0.026*
Year 0 Intangible Assets -2.14E-07 0.829 6.45E-08 0.948 1.75E-06 0.006**
Constant 1.09E+01 0.379 7.32E+00 0.440 1.65E+01 0.173
Intangible Assets growth Wald chi2=238***, n=241 Wald chi2=219***, n=241 Wald chi2=179***, n=241
Inverse Mill´s ratio 1.02E+05 0.798 2.43E+05 0.527 -2.03E+05 0.636
High Technology Manufacturing -6.56E+04 0.829 5.65E+04 0.864
Knowledge Intensive Services 6.57E+05 0.028 8.04E+05 0.013*
Seed investment stage -3.25E+05 0.314 -6.24E+05 0.072
Industry growth variable -7.57E-02 0.000*** -7.92E-02 0.000***
Year 0 Sales -3.80E-02 0.004** -4.33E-02 0.001** -7.87E-03 0.493
Year 0 Personnel 1.32E+04 0.000*** 1.38E+04 0.000***
Year 0 Intangible Assets -3.49E-01 0.000*** -3.55E-01 0.000*** -2.52E-01 0.000***
Constant 3.83E+04 0.909 1.03E+05 0.696 3.70E+05 0.300
Total Assets growth Wald chi2=84***, n=242 Wald chi2=77***, n=242 Wald chi2=26***, n=242
Inverse Mill´s ratio 5.92E+05 0.597 1.14E+06 0.287 1.67E+06 0.205
High Technology Manufacturing 4.38E+04 0.959 -2.08E+05 0.838
Knowledge Intensive Services 1.11E+06 0.188 1.01E+06 0.311
Seed investment stage -1.37E+06 0.135 -7.69E+05 0.471
Industry growth variable -2.35E-01 0.000*** -2.45E-01 0.000***
Year 0 Sales 1.85E-01 0.000*** 1.81E-01 0.000*** 6.38E-02 0.076
Year 0 Personnel -1.17E+04 0.128 -9.44E+03 0.219
Year 0 Intangible Assets -9.68E-02 0.219 -1.11E-01 0.166 -1.87E-01 0.005**
Constant 7.00E+05 0.452 4.20E+05 0.568 -2.23E+05 0.837
Statistically significant at *95%, **99% and ***99.9% confidence level.
The results of the Heckman (1979) two-step regression models differ to some extent from the
results of the basic OLS regression. The first conclusion is, however, that as the coefficient
for the PE dummy is positive at a statistically significant level in the models explaining sales
growth.   It  seems  that  PE-funding  results  in  faster  sales  growth  even  when  the  selection
effects are excluded taken that we have succeeded at excluding the selection effects reliably.
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This is, however, perhaps not fully realistic assumption, as this model supposes that the VCs
selection can be modeled solely based on the financial information on the companies and in
reality the VC selection process may be driven by unobservable variables such as business
plan and management team quality. Thus, the success of the Heckman (1979) two-step
regression models can be questioned.
For growth of personnel, intangible assets or total assets no statistically significant value
adding impact is identified based on this analysis. However, as there remains some doubt
about the successfulness in excluding the selection effects correctly we cannot rule out the
possibility of such value adding impact to exist.
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6 Conclusions
This thesis seeks to examine how the firm-level societal and economic impact of private
equity can be assessed in Finnish context by carefully reviewing the current literature and the
presented methodologies. This leads the way to answering to the second part of the research
question when selected approach and methodologies are empirically implemented in order to
analyze what can we reliably say about the firm-level societal and economic impact of the
investing activities of the members of Finnish Venture Capital Association.
The most severe challenges in conducting a reliable and valid research on the subject are, in
addition to the limited availability of suitable data, the difficulty in defining a control group
against which the PE-funded companies are compared and overcoming the selection
biasedness arising from the non-random nature of the VCs investment decisions.
The empirical drilldown to the subject begins by comparative statistical analysis between
companies that have received their first-ever PE investment in 2002-2004 and non-PE-funded
control group companies. The analysis on the development of these companies from the
investment year 0 to third year after the investment reveals explicit differences in the
development of the selected companies. The association between the development of the
chosen firm-level measures and PE-funding is further analyzed through various regression
models
The  most  relevant  and  reliable  conclusion  of  this  study  is  that  the  growth  of  sales  and
personnel of the PE-funded companies in Finland is significantly faster than the growth of
non-PE-funded companies. During the study period the average sales growth of PE-funded
companies is €4.6 million whereas the equivalent average for non-PE-funded companies is
€1.2 million. Average personnel growth is 14.1 employees for PE-funded companies but only
2.1 employees for the control group companies. The difference is statistically significant at
99.9% confidence level and the conducted OLS regression analysis further validates these
results.
The average growth of balance sheet intangible assets is €61,000 for PE-funded companies
whereas the equivalent for non-PE-funded companies is €-318,000. Mean growth of total
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assets is €910,000 for PE-funded companies and €108,000 for the control group. These
differences,  however,  do  not  quite  reach  95%  confidence  level.  In  any  case  the  basic  OLS
regressions suggest a statistically significant association between PE-funding and faster
intangible assets and total assets growth. Thus, the growth of intangible and total assets seems
to be associated with PE-funding but this dataset does not give fully unambiguous verification
for this.
The faster growth of the PE-financed companies firm-level measures presented in this thesis
may be result of the VCs being able to select portfolio companies that have comparatively
larger growth potential instead of the true added value VCs are often argued to supply. Also
both of these may apply. We cannot fully reliably conclude whether the exact source of the
faster growth truly is the operations of PE investors within the company after selecting their
investment targets. The final regression analysis employing Heckman (1979) two-step
procedure, however, seeks to exclude the selection effects from the value adding impact. The
results of this analysis are consistent with possibility of true value adding impact of VCs
resulting in faster growth of sales compared to other companies. For growth of personnel,
intangible assets or total assets no statistically significant value adding impact is identified but
this does not rule out the possibility of such value adding impact to exist. The applied
regression model seeking to exclude the selection effects supposes that the VCs selection can
be modeled solely based on the financial information on the companies, which is perhaps not
fully realistic assumption, as the VC selection process may be driven by unobservable
variables such as business plan and management team quality.
The result of comparatively greater growth of PE-funded companies’ sales, personnel,
intangible assets and total assets is even stronger for firms operating in high-tech industries,
especially within knowledge intensive services sector, and/or receiving PE-funding in seed
investment stage. These qualifications of a PE-funded company seem to be associated with
even faster relative growth compared to the matched non-PE-funded companies. The results
are  based  on  the  statistical  analysis  on  the  comparative  growth  across  different  data
categories.
There seems to be no statistically significant positive association between corporate taxes and
PE-funding. The PE-funded companies also seem to be less profitable three years after the PE
investment than their non-PE-funded counterparties. The lower profitability arises especially
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from early investment stage companies’ low profitability and these companies seem to be also
less profitable at the time they receive the PE investment. Based on the knowledge of the PE
industry we can conclude that the investors most likely seek less profitable companies with
large future potential instead of highly profitable companies already at the time of the
investment.
The findings are summarized around the hypotheses in the Table 31 below.
Table 31: Summary of the Findings
This table summarizes the key findings of the thesis.
Hypothesis Conclusions
H1. There is a positive relationship
between private equity funding and
the growth of sales, employment,
innovation, profitability, total
assets, and corporate taxes of a
company and the differences
between the private equity backed
companies and non private equity
backed companies are statistically
significant.
Based on statistical analysis and regression analysis we can conclude that the growth of
sales and personnel of the PE-funded companies in Finland is significantly faster than the
growth of sales and personnel of the matched non-PE-funded companies. Based on the
regression analysis results the growth of intangible and total assets seems to be associated
with PE-funding based but this dataset does not give fully unambiguous verification for
this, as the results of the statistical analysis do not quite reach 95% confidence level.
The faster growth of the PE-financed companies firm-level measures presented above
may be result of the VCs being able to select portfolio companies that have comparatively
larger growth potential instead of the true added value VCs are often argued to supply.
Also both of these may apply.
There seems to be no statistically significant positive association between corporate taxes
and PE-funding. The PE-funded companies also seem to be less profitable three years
after the PE investment than their non-PE-funded counterparties. The lower profitability
arises especially from early investment stage companies’ low profitability and these
companies seem to be also less profitable at the time they receive the PE investment.
H2. The relationship between
private equity funding and growth
of the chosen firm-level measures is
stronger for early stage companies
compared to later stage companies.
The result of comparatively greater growth of PE-funded companies sales, personnel,
intangible assets and total assets is stronger for firms operating in seed investment stage.
The results are based on the statistical analysis on the comparative growth across different
data categories.
Based on the same analyses the lower values for PE-funded companies’ cumulative taxes
as  well  as  the  year  3  profitability  seem to  be  even  stronger  for  firms  operating  in  seed
investment stage.
H3. The relationship between
private equity funding and growth
of the chosen firm-level measures is
stronger for companies in high-tech
industries compared to companies
in low-tech industries.
The result of comparatively greater growth of PE-funded companies sales, personnel,
intangible assets and total assets is stronger for firms operating in high-tech industries,
especially within knowledge intensive services sector. The results are based on the
statistical analysis on the comparative growth across different data categories.
There seems to be no significant difference in case of cumulative taxes or year 3
profitability of these companies.
This research has been one of the first ones to reveal the curtain behind the venture capital
industry in Finland and how the investing activities of PE investors affect their portfolio
companies. The unique hand collected dataset and employed methodologies indeed result in a
result that adds value to the current understanding of the association between PE-funding and
development of the portfolio companies in Finland. This thesis should, however, be seen
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merely as the first melody reflecting the impact of private equity funding instead of a
complete symphony on the topic. Many possible courses for additional compositions could be
identified along the way of conducting this one.
As mentioned earlier many different methodologies for excluding the impact of VC selection
effects could be implemented. The results of a research that utilizes suitable instrumental
variables for overcoming the endogeneity problem could shed additional light on the actual
value adding impact of PE-funding. Finding such variables and furthermore collecting data on
them could, however, be a challenging task. Possibly even more interesting would be a
randomized  experiment  on  the  topic  if  certain  VC  investors  would  agree  on  selecting  their
investment targets randomly for example from certain group of companies. This, however, is
most likely an unrealistic expectation to happen naturally since VCs are most likely also in
the future able and willing select their exact investment targets carefully.
In a broader global context there are many interesting possibilities for future research as well.
One possible source of added value that emerged from the discussions with the members of
FVCA is the possibility of an increase in credibility and trustworthiness of a portfolio
company as it receives funding from a well established PE investor with good reputation. This
could be possibly studied more closely through a survey study directed to the various interest
groups of selected portfolio companies.
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Appendix 2
EVCA definition of investment stages (FVCA, 2008)
Seed: Financing provided to research, assess and develop an initial concept before a business has reached the
start-up phase.
Start-up: Financing provided to companies for the product development stage, and further funds are required in
order to initiate commercial manufacturing and sales. These companies do not generate profits yet.
Other early stage: Financing provided to companies that have begun initial marketing and related development
and that require financing to achieve full commercial production and sales.
Expansion: Financing provided for the growth and expansion of an operating company, which may or may not
be breaking even or trading profitably. The capital may be used to finance increased production capacity, market
or product development and/or to provide additional working capital.
Bridge financing: Financing made available to a company in the period of transition from being privately
owned to being publicly quoted.
Secondary financing: The purchase of existing shares in a company from another private equity investment
organisation or from another shareholder or shareholders.
Rescue/Turnaround: Financing that is made available to an existing business which has experienced trading
difficulties with a view to re-establishing prosperity.
Refinancing bank debt: To reduce a company’s level of gearing.
Management buyout (MBO): Financing provided in order to enable a company’s current operating
management and investors to acquire an existing product line or business.
Management buy-in (MBI): Financing provided to enable a manager or group of managers from outside the
company to buy-in to a company with the support of private equity investors.
Venture purchase of quoted shares: The purchase of quoted shares with the purpose of delisting the company.
Other purchase of quoted shares: The purchase of shares on a public stock market.
